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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal removal statute permits the removal from state court to federal
court of actions over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction.' By
giving this option to the defendant, the removal statute ensures that the
defendanVs access to a federal forum is approximately equal to the plaintiffs.2
Yet the defendant may not get the benefit of this equal-access policy because the
plaintiffs state court complaint often will not establish all of the elements
required to invoke federal jurisdiction and, therefore, the federal courts have
greater difficulty determining whether they have original jurisdiction. This
problem arises with considerable frequency3 in actions that might be removable

Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.S.
1980, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville; J.D. 1990, Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale. The author wishes to express appreciation to colleagues Jill
Adams, Keith Beyler, Patrick Kelley, and Taylor Mattis for their reviews and comments
and to law students Penny York and Vickie Brady for their research assistance.
*

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.
2. The defendanVs removal right is not fully equal to the plaintiffs right for three
reasons. First, the removal statute itself recognizes that some types of removals are
expressly prohibited by other statutes. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1994) (prohibiting
removal of actions against a railroad and actions arising under a state's workmen's
compensation laws). Secondly, the right to remove a diversity case is limited to
nonresident defendants while all plaintiffs have the right to file a diversity action in
federal court as long as they can satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites. See infra notes
52-54 and accompanying text. Finally, while a plaintiff may seek appellate review when
a diversity case is dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, this review is denied to defendants
whose removal action is remanded to state courts on the same grounds. See infra notes
55-59 and accompanying text. For the reasons discussed in Part II(C) (1), however, these
differences are immaterial with respect to the jurisdictional issues discussed in this
Article.
3. Indeed, during 1996 alone, the Westlaw database contained more than seven
dozen district court decisions addressing the jurisdictional issues described in this Article.
At the appellate court level, at least fifteen decisions have addressed the issue since 1991.
See, e.g., Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir.), petitionfor cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1997); Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d
373 (9th Cir. 1997); Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 427 (7th
Cir. 1997); Gilman v. BHC Secs., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418 (2d Cir. 1997); Sanchez v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1996); Tapscott v. M.S. Dealer Serv.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, which exists when the parties are citizens
of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 4 If the
plaintiff files the action directly in federal court, these elements generally appear
on the face ofthe complaint because the plaintiff must affirmatively allege and
prove that jurisdiction exists.5 When the action is filed in state court, however,
many states' pleading rules do not require the plaintiff to allege a specific dollar

Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996); Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336
(5th Cir. 1995); De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S.Ct. 180 (1995); Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092 (1lth Cir. 1994); United
Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. Centermark Properties Meriden
Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1994); Asociacion Nacional De Pescadores
a Pequena Escala o Artesanales de Colombia [hereinafter ANPAC] v. Dow Quimica de
Colombia, S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994);
Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157 (6th Cir. 1993); Shaw v. Dow Brands,
Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993); Gaus v. Miles Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1992); Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 1990), vacatedfor reh'g
en banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1991), appealdismissedperstipulationofsettlement, 947

F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991).
Several legal periodicals have published articles alerting practitioners to the
problem. See, e.g., Jack E. Kams, Removal to Federal Courts and the Jurisdictional
Amount in Controversy Pursuantto State Statutory Limitations on PleadingDamage
Claims, 29 CREIGHToN L. REv. 1091 (1996); Charles A. Carlson, Removal to Federal
Court on the Basis ofDiversityJurisdiction:The "Amount in Controversy" Controversy,
69 FLA. B.J., Oct. 1995, at 77; Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr., Amount in Controversy and
Removal: CurrentTrends and StrategicConsiderations,62 DEF. COuNS. J. 509 (1995);
Lawrence W. Moore, S.J., Fifth Circuit Symposium-Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure, 41 LOY. L. REV. 469 (1995); Law and Motion-Removal-Diversity
Jurisdiction-Amount in Controversy, FED. LITIGATOR, Jan. 1995, at 307; John R.
Marley, 1993 Survey ofRecent Developments in Indiana Law Civil Procedure-1993
FederalPracticeand Procedure Updatefor Seventh CircuitPractitioners,27 IND. L.
REV. 813 (1994); John B. White, Note, FederalRemoval-JurisdictionalAmount,15 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 415 (1961). Most of these articles have merely reviewed recently
reported decisions discussing the issue, however. Few commentators have attempted to
analyze the genesis of the problem or suggest how courts might reconcile the conflicting
case law.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. 1997) provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum

or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(l) citizens of
different States. .. " Prior to this year, the statute required the amount in controversy
to exceed $50,000. The jurisdictional threshold was increased to $75,000 on January 17,
1997, as a result of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317,

110 Stat. 3847.
5. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)
("party who seeks the exercise ofjurisdiction in his favor" must allege and establish the
facts essential to show jurisdiction).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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amount of damages. In fact, a number of states prohibit such specificity,
particularly in personal injury actions. Moreover, in states that permit
specificity, the plaintiff may not be limited to the amount pled in the complaint.7
Thus, even if a plaintiff alleges an amount that is less than the federal
jurisdictional threshold, the plaintiff could ultimately recover a sum greater than
the federal minimum.
This mismatch between the federal diversity requirements and state
pleading rules has created two types of problems for federal courts. First, great
confusion exists among the federal courts as to the proper standard to apply
when reviewing the jurisdictional amount in a diversity case removed from state
court. This issue is discussed in Part II, which suggests that the best way to
eliminate the confusion and to preserve equal access under the removal statute
is to apply the same jurisdictional standard that historically has been applied in
original jurisdiction diversity cases. The second type of problem, described in
Part III, involves procedural questions such as the proper timing for removal of
cases pled under state rules and the evidence that will be considered to determine
whether jurisdiction exists. The Article concludes in Part IV that Congress
should address these procedural issues, as well as the confusion over the
jurisdictional standard, by enacting several amendments to the diversity and
removal statutes.
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING
JURISDICTION IN A REMOVAL CASE
When reviewing jurisdiction in a diversity case, whether filed under the
court's original jurisdiction or removed from state court, most courts generally
start their analyses by considering the Supreme Court's decision in St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,' which enunciated the landmark "legal
certainty" test for determining whether diversity requirements have been met.
That decision, however, discussed only the easy questions presented by the two
classic diversity cases: (1) original jurisdiction diversity actions (when the
plaintiff files the action directly in federal court); and (2) removal cases when the
plaintiffs state court complaint expressly demands a specific sum in damages
that exceeds the federal amount in controversy requirement. Left unanswered
are the hard questions presented by removal of diversity actions when the
amount in controversy is not clearly expressed in the complaint.
In the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts are sharply divided as to whether St. PaulMercury's legal certainty test

6. See infra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.

8. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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applies to the hard cases, or whether some other standard should be applied.
Section A explains how these hard cases arise in the first place. The various
jurisdictional tests are described in Section B. Section C attempts to reconcile
the conflicting authorities, suggesting that the courts adopt one uniform
standard-the legal certainty test-for reviewing the amount in controversy
requirement in all diversity cases.
A. The Incompatibilityof State PleadingRules
andFederalRemoval Requirements
Jurisdictional dilemmas arise in removal cases under two basic scenarios:
(1) cases involving an indeterminate complaint-i.e., when the plaintiff fails to
demand a specific amount in damages; and (2) cases involving a "lowball"
complaint-i.e., when the complaint demands an amount below the federal
jurisdictional threshold but the demand may be deceiving because the plaintiff
is not limited to recovery of-that amount. Both scenarios arise in large part
because of a mismatch between state pleading or procedural rules and the federal
jurisdictional requirements for removing a case from state court to federal court.
1. Problems Caused by the Indeterminate Complaint
Although the federal pleading rules require plaintiffs to allege damages in
excess of the federal jurisdictional minimum,9 this requirement generally has
been omitted from pleading rules in many states because their courts, unlike
federal courts, are courts of general jurisdiction. 0 Thus, these states do not
require plaintiffs to request a specific sum in damages or even to allege that
damages exceed a minimum sum." As a result, it may be unclear from the face

9. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides that "[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds
ofjurisdiction to support it ......
10. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2008 (West 1993). The Committee Comment
to this rule explains that § 2008, while patterned after the federal rule, deletes the
requirement of a statement of the court's jurisdiction because "Oklahoma district courts
are courts of general jurisdiction.... Thus, there is no need for pleading and proving
jurisdiction."
11. Many states have patterned their general pleading requirements upon Rule 8(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, require the complaint to contain
(1)a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ.
P. 8(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b); TENN. R. CIv. P. 8.01. As explained by the committee
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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of a plaintiffs complaint whether the amount in controversy exceeds the federal
threshold of $75,000.
Similar difficulties arise in states with rules expressly prohibiting plaintiffs
from requesting a specific monetary sum in their prayer for relief 2 or,
in a slight variation of this rule, permitting the plaintiff to plead only
3
that the amount in controversy exceeds a minimum amount.

comments to the Florida rule, this language means that "[a] complaint ...need demand
no specific amount of damages, although it may do so." FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.110(b) cmt.
Other states, however, require the plaintiff to specify the exact amount of damages. See,
e.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.01 (stating that a complaint "shall contain a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for
judgment for the relief sought; ifa recovery of money is demanded, the amount shall be
stated')(emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring pleadings to include "a demand for
judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled" but further providing
that "[n]o dollar amount shall be stated in the prayer or demand for relief'); IND. R. TRIAL
P. 8(a) (requiring pleadings to include "a demand for relief to which the pleader deems
entitled.... However, in any complaint seeking damages for personal injury or death,
or seeking punitive damages, no dollar amount or figure shall be included in the
demand"); N.J. R. Civ. PRAC. 4:5-2 ("If unliquidated money damages are claimed in any
court, other than the Special Civil Part, the pleading shall demand damages generally
without specifying the amount."); S.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (providing that "[r]elief for a sum
certain in money may be demanded for actual damages, but claims for punitive or
exemplary damages shall be in general terms only and not for a stated sum, provided
however, a party may plead that the total amount in controversy shall not exceed a stated
sum which shall limit the claim for all purposes"); WIs. STAT. § 802.02(lm) (1996)
(providing that "[w]ith respect to a tort claim seeking the recovery of money, the demand
for judgment may not specify the amount of money the pleader seeks ....

This

subsection does not affect any right of a party to specify to the jury or the court the

amount of money the party seeks").
13. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-91 (1996) ("When money damages are sought
in the demand for relief, the demand for relief shall set forth: (1) That the amount, legal
interest or property in demand is fifteen thousand dollars or more, exclusive of interest
and costs; or (2) that the amount, legal interest or property in demand is two thousand
five hundred dollars or more but is less than fifteen thousand dollars, exclusive of interest
and costs; or (3) that the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than two
thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and costs."); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.042 (West 1996) ("In any action brought in the circuit court to recover damages for
personal injury or wrongful death, the amount of general damages shall not be stated in
the complaint, but the amount of special damages, if any, may be specifically pleaded and
the requisite jurisdictional amount established for filing in any court of competent
jurisdiction."); GA. R. Civ. PRAC. CODE § 9-11-8(a) (requiring complaint to include "[a]
demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems himself entitled; provided,
however, that in actions for medical malpractice ...in which a claim for unliquidated

damages is made for $10,000.00 or less, the pleadings shall contain a demand for
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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judgment in a sum certain; and, in actions for medical malpractice in which a claim for
unliquidated damages is made for a sum exceeding $10,000.00, the demand for judgment
shall state that the pleader 'demands judgment in excess of $10,000.00' and no further
monetary amount shall be stated"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-604 (West 1996) ("Every
complaint and counterclaim shall contain specific prayers for the relief to which the
pleader deems himself or herself entitled except that in actions for injury to the person,
no ad damnum may be pleaded except to the minimum extent necessary to comply with
the circuit rules of assignment where the claim is filed."); IOWA R. Civ. P. 69(a) ("Except
in small claims and cases involving only liquidated damages, a pleading shall not state
the specific amount of money damages sought but shall state whether the amount of
damages is more or less than the jurisdictional amount."); KAN. R. Civ. P. § 60-208
("Every pleading demanding relief for damages in money in excess of $50,000, without
demanding any specific amount of money, shall set forth only that the amount sought as
damages is in excess of $50,000, except in actions sounding in contract. Every pleading
demanding relief for damages in money in an amount of $50,000 or less shall specify the
amount of such damages to be recovered."); KY. R. Civ. P. 8.01(2) ("In any action for
unliquidated damages the prayer for damages in any pleading shall not recite any sum as
alleged damages other than an allegation that damages are in excess of any minimum
dollar amount necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the court; provided, however, that
all parties shall have the right to advise the trier of fact as to what amounts are fair and
reasonable as shown by the evidence."); LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 893(A) (West
Supp. 1996) ("No specific monetary amount of damages shall be included in the
allegations or prayer for relief of any original, amended, or incidental demand. The
prayer for relief shall be for such damages as are reasonable in the premises. If a specific
amount of damages is necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the court, the right to a
jury trial, the lack ofjurisdiction of federal courts due to insufficiency of damages, or for
other purposes, a general allegation that the claim exceeds or is less than the requisite
amount is sufficient."); MIcH. R. Civ. P. 2.111(B) ("If the pleader seeks an award of
money, a specific amount must be stated if the claim is for a sum certain or a sum that
can by computation be made certain, or if the amount sought is $10,000 or less.
Otherwise, a specific amount may not be stated, and the pleading must include
allegations that show that the claim is within the jurisdiction of the court."); MINN. R.
CIv. P. 8.01 ("If a recovery of money for unliquidated damages is demanded in an
amount less than $50,000, the amount shall be stated. If a recovery of money for
unliquidated damages in an amount greater than $50,000 is demanded, the pleading shall
state merely that recovery of reasonable damages in an amount greater than $50,000 is
sought."); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 55.05 ("If a recovery of money be demanded, the amount shall
be stated, except that in actions for damages based upon an alleged tort, no dollar amount
shall be included in the demand except to determine the proper jurisdictional authority,
but the prayer shall be for such damages as are fair and reasonable. A party may argue
at trial that a specific amount of damages should be awarded even though the prayer is
for a fair and reasonable amount."); NEV. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("Where a claimant seeks
damages of more than $10,000, the demand shall be for damages 'in excess of $10,000'
without further specification of amount."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3017 (McKinney 1996) ("In
an action for medical or dental malpractice or in an action against a municipal
corporation .... the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, interpleader complaint, and
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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These rules were adopted as a means of protecting defendants from the publicity
generated by multi-million dollar claims for damages.14 But they have had the
unintended effect of making it difficult for federal courts to determine whether

third-party complaint shall contain a prayer for general relief but shall not state the
amount of damages to which the pleader deems himself entitled. If the action is brought
in the supreme court, the pleading shall also state whether or not the amount of damages
sought exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have
jurisdiction."); N.C. R. CIv. P. 8(a) ("In all negligence actions, and in all claims for
punitive damages in any civil action, wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value often thousand dollars ($10,000), the pleading shall not state the demand for
monetary relief,but shall state that the relief demanded is for damages incurred or to be
incurred in excess often thousand dollars ($10,000)."); OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("If the party
seeks more than twenty-five thousand dollars, the party shall so state in the pleading but
shall not specify in the demand for judgment the amount of recovery sought, unless the
claim is based upon an instrument required to be attached pursuant to Civ. R. 10.");
OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 12, § 2008(A) (West 1993) ("Every pleading demanding relief for
damages in money in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) shall, without
demanding any specific amount of money, set forth only that the amount sought as
damages is in excess ofTen Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), except in actions sounding
in contract. Every pleading demanding relief for damages in money in an amount of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) or less shall specify the amount of such damages sought
to be recovered."); R.I. R. CIv. P. 8(a) ("In an action for personal injury, injury to
property, or wrongful death, the pleading shall not state the amount claimed, but only that
the amount is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the court."); TEX. R. Civ. P. 47(b)
("An original pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original petition,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, shall contain (a) a short statement of the
cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved, (b) in all claims for
unliquidated damages only the statement that the damages sought are within the
jurisdictional limits of the court, and (c) a demand for judgment for all the other relief to
which the party deems himself entitled.").
14. Illinois, for example, adopted a statutory ban on pleading specific damages in
personal injury cases in 1976 because "many people are embarrassed by the high amount
of the [addamnum] clause and in many cases, the judgement [sic] no where [sic] reaches
that figure." House Debates, 79th General Assembly (June 11, 1976) (statements of Rep.
Washington regarding House Bill 3957), microformed on Debates, Fiche 177, 161st
Legislative Day, at 18 (Illinois General Assembly, House); see also Senate Debates, 79th
General Assembly (June 21, 1976) (statements of Sen. Glass explaining that House Bill
3957 "eliminates ad damnum provisions so that someone suing a doctor or hospital does
not state the total amount of the claim and thereby eliminates some adverse publicity for
doctors who are inadvertently sued for large amounts of money and, in fact, later settle
for... much less or are found not guilty"), microformed on Debates, Fiche 124, 146th
Legislative Day, at 137 (Illinois General Assembly, Senate); cf S.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)
(notes accompanying the rule explain that the ban on pleading a specific sum in claims
for punitive or exemplary damages was added "to eliminate prayers for exaggerated and
sensational claims for damages").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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they have jurisdiction over the state-pleaded complaint because the complaint
either is silent as to the amount in controversy or is ambiguous as to whether the
amount exceeds the federal minimum."
This predicament intensified after Congress increased the federal
jurisdictional amount to $50,000 in 19886 and to $75,000 in 1997."? Before
then, the $10,000 federal threshold was either the same as or lower than the
minimum required under many of these state pleading rules. For example, if the
state's minimum was set at $15,000, a pleading that alleged damages in excess
of that amount also would exceed the $10,000 federal minimum. Today,
however, if a state-pleaded complaint seeks "in excess of $15,000," it is unclear
whether the pleading also seeks damages in excess of the current $75,000 federal
threshold or whether the alleged damages are somewhere between $15,000 and
$75,000.
A few states have acknowledged this problem and have attempted to correct
it in a variety of ways.' 8 In the absence of a state resolution, however, the federal
courts have been forced to adapt their jurisdictional inquiries to account for the
pleading ambiguity.

15. In Illinois, for example, the plaintiff is prohibited from pleading a specific
amount of damages in a personal injury case but the complaint must indicate whether the
amount exceeds the jurisdictional minimum for certain types of courts. See supra notes
13-14. Thus, to have a case heard in the law division courts of most counties, the
complaint must allege damages in excess of $15,000; for Cook County, the jurisdictional
minimum is $30,000. Both of these figures, however, are less than the federal
jurisdictional minimum. Therefore, a state-pleaded complaint that alleges damages "in
excess of $30,000" is ambiguous with respect to federal jurisdiction because it is unclear

whether the amount in controversy falls somewhere between $30,000 and $75,000, or
whether it also exceeds the federal $75,000 threshold.

16. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 311,
102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988).
17. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847.
See also supra note 4.
18. Arkansas, for example, provides in its pleading rules that "[i]n claims for
unliquidated damage, a demand containing no specified amount of money shall limit
recovery to an amount less than required for federal court jurisdiction in diversity of
citizenship cases, unless language of the demand indicates that the recovery sought is in
excess of such amount." ARK. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Louisiana, while generally prohibiting
plaintiffs from pleading a specific amount of damages, has provided that "[i]f a specific
amount of damages is necessary to establish ... the lack ofjurisdiction of federal courts
due to insufficiency of damages ... a general allegation that the claim.., is less than the
requisite amount is sufficient." LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 893(A). South Carolina
similarly prohibits specific damage requests for punitive damages but provides that "a
,party may plead that the total amount in controversy shall not exceed a stated sum which
shall limit the claim for all purposes." S.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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2. Problems Caused by the Lowball Complaint
The second category of difficult removal cases arises when the plaintiff
pleads a specific amount of damages that falls below the federal jurisdictional
amount. Although such complaints would appear on their face to be
nonremovable, defendants have argued that if the plaintiff is not bound by that
demand under the particular state's procedural rules, then the demand should not
control the federal court's jurisdiction. 19 As a result, this scenario raises more
difficult questions than those presented by the indeterminate complaint because
it pits the defendant's right to remove against a plaintiffs right to avoid federal
court.
The plaintiffs right to avoid removal was established in St. PaulMercury,
in which the Supreme Court stated that "[i]f [the plaintiff] does not desire to try
his case in the federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than
the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the
defendant cannot remove."20 Thus, the plaintiff is said to be the master of his or
her complaint because the plaintiff can dictate the removability of the action
through the allegations of the complaint.21
This principle makes sense if the plaintiff is bound by the amount of
damages requested in the complaint-i.e., if the plaintiff can recover no more
than the amount specified in his or her pleading.' In that circumstance, there
can be no question that the amount in controversy is established by the specific

19. See, e.g., Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (11th Cir. 1994)
(defendant argued that plaintiffs request for damages was "illusory" because state law
"allows a fact finder to give a plaintiff any relief she is entitled to, even if she asked for
less").
20. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,294 (1938).
21. Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994); Gafford v.
General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157 (6th Cir. 1993). This principle initially was
recognized in removal cases based upon federal question jurisdiction. In that situation,
courts applied the "well-pleaded complaint rule," finding a case removable only if a
federal question appears on the face of the plaintiffs complaint. As a result, the plaintiff
is said to be the master ofthe claim. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987) (stating that the well-pleaded complaint rule "makes the plaintiffthe master of the
claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law"); see
also Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("Of course, the party
who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.").
22. See, e.g., Miss. R. CIv. P. 54(c) ("[E]very final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled by the proof and which is
within the jurisdiction of the court to grant, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings; however, final judgment shall not be enteredfor a monetary
amount greaterthan thatdemanded in the pleadingsor amendedpleadings.") (emphasis
added).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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sum pled in the complaint. The plaintiff, in effect, is waiving any claim to a
greater amount of damages. The defendant, therefore, has no right to have the
case tried in federal court because his or her exposure is clearly limited to an
amount that falls below the federal jurisdictional threshold.
The issue is controversial, however, in jurisdictions that do not limit the
plaintiff to the amount of damages pled in the complaint. A majority of the
states has adopted rules patterned after Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows a fact finder to award the plaintiff any relief to which
he or she is entitled, even if the plaintiffs complaint asked for less.' As a result,
the specific amount of damages requested in the plaintiffs complaint is not
necessarily a true indication of the amount in controversy. Although the plaintiff
requests a specific sum that falls below the federal jurisdictional threshold, the
plaintiff is not bound by that figure. Therefore, the defendant's exposure may in
fact be much greater than the federal jurisdictional cut-off.24 The federal court's
dilemma, then, is to determine whose interests should prevail.
B. Confusion Over the ProperStandard-LegalCertainty
or PreponderanceofEvidence?
The federal courts are splintered in their response to the jurisdictional
dilemmas posed by indeterminate and lowball complaints. To conduct their
jurisdictional review, many courts have adopted standards based upon the "legal
certainty" test enunciated in the St. PaulMercury decision. Others, however,
have crafted a "preponderance of evidence" standard based upon the Court's
earlier decision in McNutt v. GeneralMotors Acceptance Corp.' Beyond that,
the courts within each of the camps disagree as to the requirements of their
particular standard. The end result is a muddled array of tests that vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The various tests are described briefly below,

23. Rule 54(c) provides, in pertinent part: "Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in the party's pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c).

24. This assumes, however, that the defendant has appeared to contest the action.
In the case of a defaultjudgment, the plaintiffwould be bound by the relief requested in
the complaint. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) ("A judgment by default shall not be
different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment.").
The theory underlying this limitation "is that once the defending party receives the
original pleading he should be able to decide on the basis of the relief requested whether
he wants to expend the time, effort, and money necessary to defend the action." 10
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 139 (2d ed. 1993).

25. 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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beginning with those applied to indeterminate complaints and concluding with
tests that have been applied to lowball complaints.

1. Standards Applied to the Indeterminate Complaint
A majority of the district courts have favored some form of the St. Paul
Mercury legal certainty standard in removal cases involving indeterminate
complaints. The appellate courts, on the other hand, have rejected the legal
certainty test and adopted a preponderance test instead.
Under the St. PaulMercury standard, courts have required the defendant,
as the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to prove that
"it does not appear to a legal certainty" that the plaintiffs claim is for less than
the jurisdictional amount.26 Considerable disagreement exists, however, as to the
requirements of this test. Some courts have attempted to untangle the legal
certainty test by restating it in a simplified or affirmative manner." Thus, some

26. See, e.g., Chouest v. American Airlines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 412, 414 (E.D. La.
1993) ("The party invoking the federal courfs jurisdiction must show to a legal certainty
that each plaintiffs claim is not less than the jurisdictional amount."); Kennedy v.
Commercial Carriers, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 406, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("If challenged, the
party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts has the burden of proving
that it does not appear to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional
amount."); Hale v. Billups, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 162, 164 (M.D. La. 1985) (same); Melkus
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 503 F. Supp. 842, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (to remand case, "the court
must find that Plaintiff is incapable to a legal certainty of recovering the jurisdictional
amount"); 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1819 (2d ed. 1985) ("Once challenged, the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal courts has the burden of proving its existence by showing that it does not appear
to a legal certainty that its claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount."); 1 JAMES W.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 844-45 (2d ed. 1995) ("Courts require the plaintiff
to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is not clear to a legal certainty that
she will not recover less than the jurisdictional requirement; stated affirmatively, the
plaintiff generally is required to show that it is probable that she would recover at least
the jurisdictional minimum.") (footnotes omitted).
27. One district court in Louisiana has gone to the opposite extreme, however,
advising against any attempt to restate the test in affirmative language. In that court's
view, the "awkward negative phrasing" is necessary to avoid putting the defendant in the
position of having to prove the plaintiffs case. Atkins v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 761 F.
Supp. 444,446 n.5 (E.D. La. 1991). "The negative phrasing compensates for what would
otherwise require a defendant to act against his own interest by forcing him to prove that
damages are in excess of the jurisdictional amount." Id. The court stated that "if the
defendants can show that the plaintiffs' claims are not less than the jurisdictional amount,
they have also implicitly shown that the plaintiffs would, if successful, each recover at
least the jurisdictional amount." Id. at 446. But the court declined to rephrase the test
to reflect this interpretation.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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opinions have suggested that the test is satisfied if a "possibility" 28 exists that the
value of the matter in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount or, stated
another way, that the plaintiffs damages "could" exceed the jurisdictional
threshold.29 Other courts have interpreted the test to mean just the opposite:
rather than requiring the defendant to show that "it does not appear to a legal
certainty that the claim isfor less than the jurisdictional amount," these courts
would require the defendant to prove "to a legal certainty that the plaintiffs
claim equals or exceeds the requisite jurisdictional amount."3 In the middle are
courts that have interpreted the legal certainty test as requiring "a probability"'"
28. See, e.g., De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir.) (reviewing
district court opinion which required the removing defendant to establish "some
possibility" that the plaintiff could recover in excess of the federal minimum), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 180 (1995); Marcel v. Pool Co., 5 F.3d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1993)

(holding that the defendant satisfied the legal certainty test where "[t]he plaintiff has
alleged that he was seriously injured and the jurisprudence as set forth above indicates
there is the possibility he may be awarded significant damages, exclusive of the punitive
damages he seeks"); Beckerman v. Sands, 364 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(holding, in an original jurisdiction case, that dismissal is improper "if there is any
possibility whatever that the [plaintiffs] could recover either compensatory or punitive
damages" in excess of the federal jurisdictional minimum); cf Ball v. Hershey Foods
Corp., 842 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Conn.), affd, 14 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring
removing defendant to show a "reasonable possibility" that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional minimum).
29. See, e.g., Pakledinaz v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 737 F. Supp. 47, 48 (E.D.
Mich. 1990); cf Foret v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 534, 537 (5th

Cir. 1990) (holding it was not error for the district court to exercise jurisdiction over a
case where "the plaintiffs could have recovered more than $50,000").
30. Saunders v. Rider, 805 F. Supp. 17, 18 (E.D. La. 1992) (emphasis added); cf
Navarro v. LTV Steel Co., 750 F. Supp. 928, 929 (N.D. I1. 1990) ("Jurisdiction cannot

be based on probabilities (even ofthe highest degree) or on surmise or guesswork" and,
therefore, an action is not removable until it becomes "certain that more than [$75,000]
is in controversy."); Navarro v. LTV Steel Co., 750 F. Supp. 930, 931 (N.D. Il. 1990)
("It remains preferable to make removal depend upon certainty."); Stemmons v. Toyota
Tsusho Am., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 195, 198 (N.D. 111. 1992) (same) (citing Navarro, 750 F.
Supp. at 931); Maki v. Keller Indus., Inc., 761 F. Supp. 66, 68 (N.D. Ill.
1991) ("Just as

in Navarro,even a high degree of probability that Maki's claim may exceed the federal
jurisdictional amount does not suffice for this Court's retention ofjdrisdiction at this
point."). This formulation uses the legal certainty language and, therefore, appears to
have its foundation in the St.PaulMercury test. To the contrary, however, it appears to
turn the test on its head, with the undesirable effect of placing the defendant "in the
unenviable position of having to prove the plaintiff's case." Garza v. Bettcher Indus.,
Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753, 756 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
31. See, e.g., Kennard v. Harris Corp., 728 F. Supp. 453, 454-55 (E.D. Mich.
1989); Corwin Jeep Sales & Serv. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 670 F. Supp. 591,
595 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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or "a reasonable probability" that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional threshold 2
The appellate courts, however, have rejected the legal certainty test and
have looked instead to a preponderance of evidence test based upon McNutt.3

32. See, e.g., Mutual First, Inc., v. O'Charleys, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 281,283 (S.D.
Ala. 1989) (emphasis added). These variations on the legal certainty standard differ from
court to court-and sometimes from opinion to opinion by the same court. For example,
one district court observed that the Seventh Circuit has explained the standard in a variety
of ways:
In Jeffries v. Silvercup Bakeries, Inc., 434 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1970), the
court described it as "a probability that the value of the matter in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional amount." In Ross v. Inter-OceanIns. Co., 693 F.2d
659, 663 (7th Cir. 1982), the court stated that the jurisdictional amount was
satisfied "[i]f there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can recover
more than $[5]0,000 on his claim." And in Sharp Electric Corp. v. Copy
Plus,Inc., 939 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1991), the court reversed dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds that "'averdict, if rendered for [the amount
necessary to exceed $50,000] would be excessive and set aside for that
reason."'
Engle Corp. v. American College of Legal Med., No. 91 C 6486, 1992 WL 177084, at
*2 (N.D. II. July 17, 1992) (quoting Bell v. Preferred Life Societies, 320 U.S. 238, 243
(1943)).
33. Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997);
Gilman v. BHC Securities, Inc., 104 F.3d 1418, 1421 (2d Cir. 1997); Sanchez v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996); Tapscott v. MS Dealer
Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 1996); Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d
1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995); Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th Cir.
1993); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364,366 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993). In adopting the
preponderance test, the Seventh Circuit explained its reasoning as follows:
St. Paulholds that when a plaintiff asserts federal jurisdiction, the defendant
may challenge the amount in controversy, but the plaintiffs contentions will
stand unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is actually worth less
than the jurisdictional amount.... This standard should not be confused,
however, with what a defendant must prove to invoke jurisdiction in a
removal action .... We think the Supreme Court dictated the proper standard
in McNutt v. GeneralMotors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S. Ct. 780:
"If his allegations ofjurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any
appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof. And where
they are not so challenged, the court may still insist that the jurisdictional
facts be established or the case be dismissed, and for that purpose, the court
may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence."
Shaw, 994 F.2d at 366 n.2. Based upon this broad language, it is unclear whether the
courtfs analysis applies to all types of removal cases or whether it applies only to the hard
cases presented by the indeterminate or lowball complaints. The facts of the case show
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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They, too, have varied in their descriptions of what the test requires. The Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have construed the preponderance test as
requiring a removing defendant to show that the plaintiffs total damages "more
likely than not" exceed the jurisdictional amount.3 4 The Second and Seventh
Circuits, on the other hand, have explained the test as requiring proof "to a
'reasonable probability' that the claim is in excess of the jurisdictional amount.35

that the court was dealing with an indeterminate complaint. Therefore, although the
opinion could be read to suggest that the McNutt standard applies in any removal action,
it is possible that the court intended to adopt the McNutt test only with respect to cases
involving indeterminate or lowball complaints.
34. Sanchez, 102 F.2d at 404 (stating that under preponderance burden, "the
defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is 'more likely than not' that the
amount in controversy exceeds" the jurisdictional minimum); Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1357
("[W]here a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand for damages in state court, a
removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy more likely than not exceeds the [$75,000] jurisdictional requirement.");
Allen, 63 F.3d at 1336 (using preponderance standard, the court considered whether it
was "more likely than not" that plaintiffs damages exceed the jurisdictional amount);
Gafford, 997 F.2d at 158 ("We conclude that the 'preponderance of the evidence' ('more

likely than not') test is the best alternative.").
35. Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir.
1997); Gilman, 104 F.3d at 1421; Shaw, 994 F.2d at 366; cf Gilmer v. Walt Disney Co.,
915 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (W.D. Ark. 1996) (adopting preponderance standard and stating
that "[d]efendants may meet their burden 'by sufficient proof that a plaintiff's verdict
reasonablymay exceed [the jurisdictional] amount'") (emphasis added); Krider Pharmacy

& Gifts, Inc., v. Medi-Care Data Sys., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 221, 225 (E.D. Wis. 1992)
(finding that remand required because defendant "has failed to demonstrate upon this
record the existence of a reasonable possibility that [the plaintiff] could recover

cumulatively more than the $50,000 jurisdictional minimum on its claims").
Interestingly, although the Gilman decision suggested that its standard is based
upon McNutt, earlier Second Circuit cases suggest that its "reasonable probability"

inquiry evolved from the legal certainty test. The circuit's "reasonable probability"
standard was first enunciated for removal cases in UnitedFoodand CommercialWorkers
Union, Local919 v. CentermarkPropertiesMeriden Square,Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 304-05
(2d Cir. 1994). But the UFCWstandard was adopted verbatim from TongkookAmerica,
Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994), which was a case
involving an original jurisdiction scenario-i.e., where the plaintiff has filed the
complaint directly in federal court. Tongkook, in turn, cites to Moore v. Betit, 511 F.2d
1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1975), which explained the "reasonable probability" standard as
follows:
Federal courts have consistently held that absolute certainty in valuation of
the right involved is not required to meet the amount in controversy
requirement but rather the requirement is that there be a reasonable
probability of an amount in controversy exceeding [the] jurisdictional amount
if an amount can be ascertained pursuant to some realistic formula....
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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The difference between these formulations of the test may be purely
semantic because a "probability," by definition, is "[a] condition or state created
when there is more evidence in favor of the existence of a given proposition than
there is against it."36 Thus, a reasonable probability would appear to be the
equivalent of a "more likely than not" test. Because the courts have employed
differing terminology, however, it is unclear whether the standards are in fact the
same or different.
2. Standards Applied to the Lowball Complaint
As suggested above,37 there is some question as to whether cases involving
a lowball complaint can be removed at all. Because the plaintiff has demanded
a specific amount that falls below the federal jurisdictional minimum, such
actions would appear to be nonremovable under the language in St. Paul
Mercury suggesting that a plaintiff can avoid removal simply by suing for an
amount less than the federal minimum. 8 But the two appellate courts that have
addressed the issue have declined to interpret St. PaulMercury that broadly,39
holding instead that a case is removable so long as the defendant can establish
that the amount in controversy in fact exceeds the federal jurisdictional
threshold." They disagree, however, on the appropriate test to be applied in
such a case.

Conversely, courts should dismiss only when it is clear to a legal certainty
that jurisdictional amounts cannot be met.
Id.

36.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990).
37. See supranotes 19-24 and accompanying text.
38. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,294 (1938).

39. Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1096 n.6 (11th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that a broad reading of St. PaulMercury might suggest "that when plaintiff
seeks less than the jurisdictional amount, the case cannot be removed as a matter of

law-defendant gets no chance to prove jurisdiction"); see also De Aguilar v. Boeing Co.,
47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995).
The courts emphasized that a careful reading of St. Paul Mercury shows that the
Courts decision "plainly was premised on the notion that the plaintiff would not be able
to recover more in state court than what was alleged in the state court complaint." De
Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1410. See also Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096 n.6 which states that the court
does not follow the seemingly absolute standard of St. Paul Mercury and Iowa City
Railway v. Bacon, 236 U.S. 305 (1915), "because these cases were decided when

different rules about pleading damages (in general, much more strict) and about
jurisdiction were in effect. We think we are not bound by these old cases, although they
are decisions of the Supreme Court."
40. DeAguilar,47 F.3d at 1411; Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095-96.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Several early district court decisions applied a version of the legal certainty
test, holding that removal was proper if there was "some possibility" that the
plaintiff could recover in excess of the federal minimum.4 But the Fifth Circuit
and the Eleventh Circuit have rejected this standard as being too lenient.42 The
Eleventh Circuit has imposed a heavy burden upon the defendant, holding that
a defendant may remove the case only upon proving that the plaintiff has either
falsely or incompetently assessed the value of the case-i.e., "defendant must
prove to a legal certainty that plaintiffs claim must exceed [the jurisdictional
amount]."'43 Although this application of the legal certainty standard is stringent,
the court stressed that it "does not mean that a removing defendant can never
prevail. A defendant could remain in federal court if he showed that, if the
plaintiff prevails on liability, an award below the jurisdictional amount would be
outside the range of permissible awards because the case is clearly worth more
than [$75,000].""
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, adopted a standard more favorable to
defendants, holding that "the plaintiffs claim remains presumptively correct
unless the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
' The court
amount in controversy is greater than the jurisdictional amount."45
explained that "[tihe preponderance burden forces the defendant to do more than
point to a state law that might allow the plaintiff to recover more than what is
pled. The defendant must produce evidence that establishes that the actual

41. In De Aguilar,for example, "the district court held that the removing defendant
had to establish that there is 'some possibility' that the plaintiff could recover over
$50,000." DeAguillar,47 F.3d at 1411.
42. Id at 1411 (stating that the "some possibility" standard applied by the district
court was "too permissive"); Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's
prior decision in Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 1990), vacatedfor
reh'gen banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appealdismissedperstipulationofsettlement, 947
F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991), which held that "anything less than requiring defendant to
prove that, should plaintiff prevail, she should be entitled to at least the jurisdictional
amount was too permissive").
43. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.
44. Id.at 1096.
45. De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412. In reaching this decision, the Fifth Circuit
deviated from the position the court took five years earlier in Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915
F.2d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 1990), vacatedfor reh'g en banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal
dismissedper stipulation of settlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991). Kliebert, like
Burns, would have required the defendant to prove that it was "legally certain" that the
plaintiffs would recover more than the jurisdictional amount. Kliebert, 915 F.2d at 146.

The decision has no precedential value, however, because it was vacated for an en banc
hearing that subsequently became unnecessary when the parties settled the case. The
Fifth Circuit, therefore, was free to consider the issue as one of first impression when it
decided De Aguilar.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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amount in controversy exceeds

[$75,0001].146

Once the defendant meets this

burden, "removal is proper, provided that the plaintiff has not shown that it is
legally certain that his recovery will not exceed the amount stated in the state
complaint."'

C. Identifying the ProperStandardof JudicialReview
The federal courts can resolve a great deal of the confusion surrounding
removal cases simply by agreeing upon one standard to apply when conducting
their jurisdictional inquiry into the amount in controversy. Analysis of the
historical underpinnings of the St. PaulMercury and McNutt cases shows that
St. PaulMercury's legal certainty test is the most appropriate test to use.

1. Historical Origins of the Jurisdictional Standards
Diversity jurisdiction-and the corresponding right to remove a case from
state court to federal court if the requirements for original diversity jurisdiction
are satisfied-have coexisted under the federal Judiciary Act since its inception
in 1789.48 The precise rationale for extending this right to litigants is not entirely

46. De Aguilar,47 F.3d at 1412 (emphasis added).
47. Curiously, the court stated that this is "not a burden-shifting exercise." Rather,
the court stated that:
[O]nce the defendant has pointed to an adequate jurisdictional amount, the
situation becomes analogous to the "typical" circumstances in which the St.
Paul Mercury "legal certainty" test is applicable: The defendant has
established, by a preponderance, that federal jurisdiction is warranted. At this
point, "[i]t
must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than
the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal."
Id.
48. Plaintiffs were granted diversity jurisdiction under section 11 of the First
Judiciary Act, which provided, in pertinentpart:
That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or
value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or
petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State ....
Act of September 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79.
Removals were governed by § 12, which provided:
And be it further enacted, That if a suit be commenced in any state court
against an alien, or by a citizen ofthe state in which the suit is brought against
a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum
or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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clear, but the traditional explanation is that Congress feared that state courts
would be prejudiced against litigants from other states.
Whatever the motivating force behind the diversity and removal statutes,
however, it would appear that the policy applies with equal force to both
plaintiffs and defendants. Indeed, the legislation on its face gives plaintiffs and
defendants equal access to a federal forum when all of the prerequisites for

the satisfaction of the court; and the defendant shall, at the time of entering
his appearance in such state court, file a petition for the removal of the cause
for trial into the next circuit court, to be held in the district where the suit is
pending .... and offer good and sufficient surety for his entering in such
court, on the first day of its session, copies of said process against him, and
also for his there appearing and entering special bail in the cause, if special
bail was originally requisite therein, it shall then be the duty of the state court
to accept the surety, and proceed no further in the cause, and any bail that
may have been originally taken shall be discharged, and the said copies being
entered as aforesaid, in such court of the United States, the cause shall there
proceed in the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process
Id. § 12.
49. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
337-43, 355-63 (2d ed. 1984). As this treatise points out, "[n]either the debates of the
Constitutional Convention nor the records of the First Congress shed any substantial light
on why diversity jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts by the Constitution or why
the First Congress exercised its option to vest that jurisdiction in the federal courts." 13B
id. at 337. The "traditional, and most often cited, explanation" is "the fear that state
courts would be prejudiced against out-of-state litigants." 13B id. at 338. Other
historians have theorized that the real fear was of state legislatures rather than state
courts-Le., the fear that state legislation would disallow judicially established claims or

set aside jury verdicts. 13B id. at 339. These theories have been the subject of much
debate, with one camp alleging there was no evidence of state prejudice in the period
prior to the drafting of the Constitution and the other camp alleging "there were charges
during the state constitutional conventions of reprisals by the judiciaries of one state
against citizens of another." 13B id. at 340-41.
Other theories postulated for the creation of diversity jurisdiction include: (1) "that

diversity jurisdiction is necessary in order to implement the constitutional guarantee that
'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the several States;' (2) "that the federal courts qualitatively are so superior to the state
courts that it is desirable to channel as many cases as possible to the federal courts, or at
least that out-of-state litigants who have no opportunity to work for the improvement of
the state courts, should be spared exposure to them;" (3) "that the existence of concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction creates a competition between the two that acts as a spur to
higher standards ofjustice in each court system;" and (4) "the fear on the part of investors
that local prejudice may exist." 13B id. at 358-63. Each of these theories has its own

weaknesses, as described more fully in the treatise. 13B id.
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diversity jurisdiction are present.5 0 As one commentator observed, "Removal is
simply a mode by which the right to resort under certain circumstances to the
Federal courts rather than to the State courts is secured to the defendants as well
as the plaintiffs, or, as has been said, an indirect mode of exercising original
jurisdiction."'"
These rights are not entirely equal, of course, because the removal statute
provides that only non-residentdefendants may remove a case to federal court
on diversity grounds,52 while the diversity statute currently makes the right
available to all plaintiffs. 3 This limitation, however, merely restricts the number
of defendants who may exercise removal rights; it does not alter the two basic
prerequisites for jurisdiction: diversity of citizenship between the parties and an
amount in dispute that exceeds the federal jurisdictional amount. Indeed, these
two key elements have been required of both original jurisdiction diversity cases
and diversity removal cases from the first Judiciary Act to the present. 4
Removal actions also differ from original jurisdiction actions with respect
to appellate review. When a district court dismisses a plaintiffs original
jurisdiction diversity action, the dismissal is appealable as a final order of the

50. Originaljurisdiction cases fall under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which provides that
"district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between... citizens of

different States." Removal cases fall under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which provides that a
defendant may remove "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction."
51. JAMES HAMILTON LEWiS, REMOVAL OF CAUSES 104 (1923).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994) (stating that removal of a case based upon federal
question jurisdiction is removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties but that "[a]ny other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such

action is brought").
53. There have been efforts to limit plaintiffs' access to diversity jurisdiction as

well. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE 38-42 (1990) (suggesting that Congress virtually eliminate
diversity jurisdiction but suggesting, as a modest backup proposal, that Congress take
certain steps to limit diversity jurisdiction such as prohibiting plaintiffs from invoking
diversity jurisdiction in their home states).
54. The First Judiciary Act listed this requirement in section 1 's grant of diversity
jurisdiction and repeated-it in the removal provisions in section 12. The current statute,
on the other hand, expressly states the requirement only in 28 U.S.C. § 1332's provisions
granting district courts original jurisdiction over diversity cases. The removal statute
implicitly incorporates the identical requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) by giving
defendants the right to remove "any civil action brought in a State court of which the
[federal] courts ... have original jurisdiction ......
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district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. ss Defendants initially had a
reciprocal right to appeal in removal cases,56 but Congress repealed the provision
authorizing appellate review of remand orders in 188717 and, in its place, enacted
a provision expressly prohibiting appellate review.58 Because there is no
legislative history to explain the amendments, it is not entirely clear why
Congress eliminated the right to appeal a remand order. But none of the
potential explanations" 9 for the change suggests that Congress intended to

55. Section 1291 provides that federal appellate courts "shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... , except
where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
56. The First Judiciary Act of 1789 did not mention appellate review of remand
orders but the courts assumed that defendants had such a right. This right was made
explicit in 1875 with amendments to the Act which expressly provided that remand
orders "shallbe reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or an appeal .... " Act
of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (emphasis added).
57. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 6, 24 Stat. 552, 555.
58. Section 2 of the Act stated:
Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any circuit
court ofthe United States, and the circuit court shall decide that the cause was
improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court
from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into
execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the circuit court
so remanding shall be allowed.
Act of March 3, 1887, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994).
59. By examining the historical circumstances of the era surrounding this
amendment, one scholar has suggested several potential explanations for the change.
Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands: ProposedAmendments to the
FederalRemoval Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83, 101-02 (1994). One explanation is that

Congress was concerned about a burgeoning docket before the Supreme Court and
intended to alleviate the overload by foreclosing at least one type of appeal. Id at 95-96,
101. A second is that Congress was outraged by corporate abuse of diversity and
removal jurisdiction and wanted to curtail the strategic advantage that a corporation
gained through its "ability... to exhaust a plaintiffs resources or stamina by appealing
a remand order to the Supreme Court in distant Washington, D.C." Id. at 94-97, 101.
This latter theory is in line with the Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress, in
banning appeal of remand orders, "established the policy of not permitting interruption
ofthe litigation of the merits of a removed cause by prolonged litigation of questions of
jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed." United States v. Rice,
327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946).
A third possibility was that Congress had intended to bar appellate review only in
cases that were removed on grounds of local prejudice. Wasserman, supra,at 101-02.
This theory is based upon the fact that the ban on appellate review was tacked onto a
paragraph providing for remand of these types of cases. Id.at 101. "It may be that it was
these remand orders-which, even if erroneous, would not have caused much harm-that
Congress had in mind when it barred review of remand orders." Id at 102. The Supreme
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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impose a more stringent removal standard on defendants. Indeed, the 1887 Act
did not alter the amount in controversy or diversity requirement in any way.
Rather, the Act merely provided that once the district court decided whether or
not the defendant had met those requirements, that decision was not subject to
appeal. In short, although the defendant's right to remove is not perfectly
symmetrical with the plaintiffs right to file a diversity action in federal court,
both parties are subject to the identical requirements for getting in the door of the
federal courthouse in the first place.
Judicial scrutiny of these requirements has evolved over time. The courts
initially took a hands-off approach. Thus, when a plaintiff filed a diversity case
in federal court, the court did not inquire into the factual basis of the plaintiffs
jurisdictional allegations on its own motion, but rather, responded only to
jurisdictional challenges raised in a motion to dismiss or a plea of abatement.60
As long as the complaint properly alleged that the parties were of diverse
citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeded the federal minimum, the
defendant was required to challenge the sufficiency of those facts through the
appropriate motion; failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the issue if the
defendant pled to the merits instead.61
When the defendant did properly raise a jurisdictional challenge, the courts
generally looked to the plaintiffs demand to determine whether a sufficient
amount was in controversy.62 That demand was subject to scrutiny, however, to
determine only whether the law permitted a recovery of that amount, as
explained by Chief Justice Ellsworth in Wilson v. Daniel:
It was not intended to say, that on every such question ofjurisdiction,
the demand of the Plaintiff is alone to be regarded; but that the value of the
thing put in demand furnished the rule. Thus, in an action of debt on a bond
for 100f, the principal and interest are put in demand, and the Plaintiff can

Court rejected this explanation, however, stating that even though the prohibition on
appeals was included in the same paragraph as the remand authorizations for local
prejudice cases, the language of the prohibition unambiguously banned appeals in any

cause removed from a state court. Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U.S. 56, 58 (1887).
60. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,287 n.10 (1936).

61. McNutt v. General Motors Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 183 (1936) (citing D'Wolf v.
Rabaud, 26 U.S. 476, 498 (1828)); compare Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. 126, 127

(1804) (where the complaint fails to plead the necessary jurisdictional allegations, the
court lacks jurisdiction and the issue is not waived by the litigants' failure to raise the
issue because it is "the duty of the Court to see that they had jurisdiction, for the consent
of the parties could not give it").
62. Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. 401, 405 (1798) (in rejecting the argument that the
amount in controversy is to be determined by the amount of the jury verdict, the Court,
per Chief Justice Ellsworth, stated that the matter in dispute is determined by "the thing
demanded.., and not the thing found").
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recover no more, though he may lay his damages at 10,000S. The form of the
The nature of the case must certainly guide the judgment of the Court; and
whenever the law makes a rule, that rule must be pursued. action, therefore,
gives in that case the legal rule. But in an action of trespass, or assault and
battery, where the law prescribes no limitation as to the amount to be
recovered, and the Plaintiff has a right to estimate his damages at any sum, the
damage stated in the declaration is the thing put in demand, and presents the
only criterion, to which, from the nature of the action, we can resort in settling
the question ofjurisdiction.
The proposition then is simply this: Where the law gives no rule, the
demand of the Plaintiffimust furnish one; but where the law gives the rule, the
legal cause of action, and not the Plaintiffs demand, must be regarded.63
In short, the federal courts evaluated the plaintiffs demand only to
determine whether the plaintiffs particular legal theory or cause of action would
permit a recovery in the amount of damages claimed in the complaint. In
conducting this review, the courts distinguished between two types of cases: (1)
those in which the recoverable damages were fixed, such as in an action arising
out of a contract; and (2) suits for unascertained damages, such as in actions
based on tort.' In the former case, the courts would review the allegations set
forth in the body of the complaint-and not just the demand or prayer for
relief-to determine whether the amount in controversy requirement was
satisfied. 5 Thus, "[i]f the action were ex contractuon a money demand and for
a fixed sum, and the principal, interest and damages together did not exceed
$500, then it would not be removable, although the prayer for judgment might
be for an amount greater than $500.16
In tort actions, however, the courts deferred to the plaintiffs demand as
"presumptively the amount in dispute"'67 because "[i]n suits prosecuted
to recover

63. Id.at 407-08.
64. See, e.g., Culver v. Crawford County, 6 F. Cas. 948, 949 (W.D. Ark. 1877);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Roehling, 11 II1. App. 264, 266 (4th Dist. 1882).
65. Lee v. Watson, 68 U.S. 337, 339 (1863) ("In an action upon a money demand,
where the general issue is pleaded, the matter in dispute is the debt claimed, and its
amount, as stated in the body of the declaration, and not merely the damages alleged, or
the prayer for judgment at its conclusion, must be considered in determining the question
whether this court can take jurisdiction on a writ of error sued out by the plaintiff.").
66. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 11 I11. App. at 266; see also Culver, 6 F. Cas. at
949 ("In an action on a money demand, the matter in dispute is the debt claimed; and its
amount as stated in the body of the complaint, and not merely the damages alleged in the
prayer for judgment at its conclusion, must be considered in determining the question
whether the court can take jurisdiction.").
67. People v. The Judges of the New York Common Pleas, 2 Denio 197, 198 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1846); see also Culver, 6 F. Cas. at 949 ("U]n a suit for unascertained damages,
the only test of the amount in dispute is found in the prayer for relief."); Louisville &
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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damages for a tort, there can be no rule to determine the amount in controversy,
unless it be to take the sum claimed by the plaintiff as damages."' For example,
as one court explained, even if the plaintiffs claim is for injury to property of a
fixed and ascertained value, the plaintiff is not limited to such compensatory
damages in a tort action; the plaintiff also may be entitled to recover punitive
damages, which would not be fixed or ascertained." The courts, therefore, relied
exclusively upon the plaintiffs demand to determine the amount in controversy;
there was no further scrutiny of the reasonableness of that demand.
The courts' level of inquiry was raised slightly, however, following
amendments to the Judiciary Act in 1875.70 The Act imposed a new affirmative
duty upon the courts to police their own jurisdiction, requiring the circuit courts7'
to dismiss any case in which
it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said circuit court, at any time after
such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really
and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been
improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants,
for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act
72

The Supreme Court recognized, therefore, that under the 1875 Act, "the trial
court is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, but may, of its own motion,
if led to believe that its
jurisdiction is not properly invoked, inquire into the facts
73
as they really exist.1
The Court emphasized, however, that in making this inquiry, the trial court
"exercises a legal and not a personal discretion. . . ."' The court stated that a
judge could not dismiss a case merely because, during the trial or hearing of the
action, the judge received "impressions amounting to a moral certainty that it
does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within the

Nashville R., 11 Il. App. at 266 ("[I]n an action sounding in tort,... the damages as
laid by the plaintiff in his declaration, is the test ofthe value or amount of the matter in
dispute.").
68. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 11111. App. at 266.
69. Id.
70. The Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472.
71. Under section 1 of the Act, the circuit courts had original jurisdiction,
concurrent'with state courts, over diversity cases. Id. § 1.
72. Id.
73. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898).
74. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 559 (1886).
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jurisdiction of the court."75 Such personal convictions, no matter how strongly
felt, are insufficient for the court to dismiss the case; dismissal is warranted only
when "the facts on which the persuasion is based, when made distinctly to
76
appear on the record, create a legal certainty of the conclusion based on them."
In so holding, the Court recognized a two-part review of the jurisdictional
amount stated in the plaintiffs complaint.- The first step is the inquiry recognized
by the earlier Supreme Court decisions for cases in which the damages are fixed
by the cause of action: "[I]n some cases it might appear as a matter of law, from
the nature of the case stated in the pleadings, that there could not legally be a
judgment recovered for the amount necessary to the jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the damages were laid in the declaration at a larger sum. " " Thus, "[w]here the
law gives no rule, the demand of the plaintiff must furnish one; but where the
law gives the rule, the legal cause of action, and not the plaintiffs demand, must
be regarded.""
The second part of the test targets tort claims and other actions involving
unliquidated damages, requiring the court to inquire into the factual basis for the
plaintiffs damage request. This part of the test recognizes the plaintiffs demand
is not conclusive as to the actual value of the matter in dispute. Rather, the court
may dismiss the case if it finds, "as matter of fact, upon evidence legally
sufficient 'that the amount of damages stated in the declaration was colorable,
and had been laid beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery,
for the purpose of creating a case' within the jurisdiction of the court."7 9
Enactment of the 1875 amendments also prompted the Court to reconsider
the issue of which party should bear the burden of proving jurisdiction.
Although early Supreme Court decisions suggested that the party challenging

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 560.
78. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. 401, 408 (1798)).
79. Id at 561 (quoting Wilson, 3 U.S. at 408). The term "colorable" is defined as
"that which is in appearance only, and not reality, what it purports to be, hence
counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 265
(6th ed. 1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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jurisdiction had the burden of proving that jurisdiction did not exist, 0 the McNutt
decision concluded otherwise."'
McNutt was a federal question case, but under the jurisdictional statute at
that time, such suits could be brought in federal court only if the matter in
controversy exceeded $3,000.2 The jurisdictional amount came under scrutiny
in McNutt when the defendant's answer denied the jurisdictional allegations set
forth in the plaintiffs complaint. 3 In response to a request from the court, the
plaintiff filed an additional brief on the jurisdictional question, but the brief did
nothing more than point to the allegations of the complaint; no evidence was
introduced to support the general allegation that the amount in controversy
exceeded $3,000. Due to the absence of such evidence, resolution of the
jurisdictional issue depended upon which party had the burden of proof-more
precisely, the burden of production 8 5-in the case.86
The Court noted that the 1875 amendments to the Judiciary Act prescribed
a uniform rule and, therefore, courts should adopt a consistent practice in dealing
with jurisdictional questions. The Court concluded that the burden of
establishing jurisdiction should be placed upon the party "who claims that the
power of the court should be exerted in his behalf. As he is seeking relief

80. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Graves, 55 U.S. 505, 510 (1852) ("[A]lthough in the
courts of the United States it is necessary to set forth the grounds of their cognizance as

courts of limited jurisdiction, yet wherever jurisdiction shall be averred in the pleadings,
in conformity with the laws creating those courts, it must be taken primafacie as
existing, and that it is incumbent on him who would impeach that jurisdiction for causes
dehors the pleadng, [sic] to allege and prove such causes; that the necessity for the
allegation and the burden of sustaining it by proof, both rest upon the party taking the
exception.").
81. McNutt v. General Motors Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1936).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1936) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)). The
amount in controversy requirement was eliminated for federal question cases in 1980.
Pub. L. No. 96-486 (1980).

83. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 179-80.
84. Id at 180-81. The jurisdictional statute in effect at that time permitted diversity
actions in which the amount in controversy exceeded the value of $3,000, exclusive of
interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1936).

85. As the Supreme Court recently explained, the term "burden of proof' was used
for many years to describe two distinct concepts: "Burden of proof was frequently used
to refer to what we now call the burden of persuasion-the notion that if the evidence is
evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose. But it was also
used to refer to what we now call the burden of production-a party's obligation to come
forward with evidence to support its claim." Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994) (citing JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 355-84 (1898)).

86. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 181.
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subject to this supervision, it follows that he must carry throughout the litigation
the burden of showing that he is properly in court."87 The opinion described this
burden as follows:
He must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction. If he
fails to make the necessary allegations he has no standing. If he does make
them, an inquiry into the existence ofjurisdiction is obviously for the purpose
of determining whether the facts support his allegations.... If his allegations
of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate
manner, he must support them by competent proof. And where they are not
so challenged the court may still insist that the jurisdictional facts be
established or the case be dismissed, and for that purpose the court may
demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a
preponderance of evidence."
Unfortunately, the Court cited no authority for this preponderance of
evidence requirement and gave no explanation why that standard would be
appropriate for all jurisdictional inquiries. The Court revisited the jurisdictional
issue, however, with a more detailed analysis two years later in the St. Paul
Mercury decision.
The St. PaulMercury case arose when the company filed an action in state
court alleging that the St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. had breached a workers'
compensation insurance contract.8 9 The complaint demanded damages in the
amount of $4,000, which was greater than the $3,000 then required for federal
jurisdiction,' and the insurance company removed the action to federal court.91
The case took a twist when the plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint,
repeating the original demand for $4,000, but including an exhibit that itemized
the various damages for a total of only $ 1,380 .8 9 .92
After the district court entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of
$1,162.98, the court of appeals declined to review the decision on the merits,
holding instead that the action should have been remanded to state court because
the record showed that the plaintiffs claim did not exceed the federal
jurisdictional minimum.93 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately
held that the case had been properly removed because at the time ofremoval, the

87. Id. at 189.
88. Id.
89. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 284-85 (1936).
90. Id. at 285-86 (citing Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091,
amended by 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1936)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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lump sum damages demanded by the plaintiff were clearly in excess of the
federal minimum and the defendant had no reason to believe that the claim was
for less than that amount.94
In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that its earlier decision in
McNutt placed the burden of establishing jurisdiction upon the party that invoked
the court's authority.9" Thus, in an original jurisdiction diversity case, "[it is
plaintiffs burden both to allege with sufficient particularity the facts creating
jurisdiction, in view of the nature of the right asserted, and, if appropriately
challenged, or if inquiry be made by the court of its own motion, to support the
allegation."9" The Court made no mention, however, of the "preponderance of
evidence" language in McNutt, but instead gave the following landmark
explanation of the judicial inquiry to be conducted in original jurisdiction
diversity cases:
[T~he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less
than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The inability of the
plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not
show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction. Nor does the fact that the
complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense to the claim. But if, from
the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty that the plaintiff
cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied
to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount,
and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed.97
The Court's use of the term "legal certainty" was perhaps unfortunate
because that terminology has created much of the confusion that exists-today
regarding the proper level ofjudicial inquiry. But a comparison of this passage
from St. PaulMercury against the Court's earlier descriptions of the judicial
inquiry98 demonstrates that the Court was not enunciating a new test in St. Paul
Mercury, but merely was providing a shorthand description of the two-part test
set forth in the earlier cases. In other words, the legal certainty test scrutinizes
(1) whether it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover in excess of the
jurisdictional amount because the cause of action limits recovery to a fixed
amount; and (2) whether it is factually impossible for the plaintiff to recover

94. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 295-96.
95. Id. at 288 n.10.
96. Id.
97. Id.
at 288-89 (footnotes omitted).
98. See Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 559-61 (1886); see supra notes 74-79
and accompanying text.
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such an amount-i.e., whether plaintiffs demand is beyond a reasonable
expectation of recovery in cases in which the amount of damages is not limited
by the cause of action. 9
After describing the judicial inquiry for original jurisdiction cases, the St.
PaulMercury decision discussed the applicability of that test to removal actions
in which the plaintiff had pled a specific amount of damages exceeding the
federal threshold. The Court suggested that the sum claimed by the plaintiff is
entitled to even greater deference in that situation than when the plaintiff has
filed the lawsuit directly in federal court. 00
In a cause instituted in the federal court the plaintiff chooses his forum. He
knows or should know whether his claim is within the statutory requirement
as to amount. His good faith in choosing the federal forum is open to
challenge not only by resort to the face of his complaint, but by the facts
disclosed at trial, and if from either source it is clear that his claim never could
have amounted to the sum necessary to give jurisdiction there is no injustice
in dismissing the suit....

A different situation is presented in the case of a suit instituted in a state
court and thence removed. There is a strong presumption that the plaintiff has
not claimed a large amount in order to confer jurisdiction on a federal court
or that the parties have colluded to that end.... Of course, if, upon the face
of the complaint, it is obvious that the suit cannot involve the necessary
amount, removal will be futile and remand will follow. But the fact that it
appears from the face of the complaint that the defendant has a valid defense,
if asserted, to all or a portion of the claim, or the circumstance that the rulings
of the district court after removal reduce the amount recoverable below the
jurisdictional requirement, will not justify remand. And though, as here, the
plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment of his
pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount, this does not deprive
the district court ofjurisdiction.10'
In short, the St. PaulMercury decision made it clear that the legal certainty
test applies with equal vigor to the "easy" removal case-i.e., one in which the
plaintiff has expressly demanded a specific sum that exceeds the federal
minimum-as well as to the diversity case filed directly in federal court by a
plaintiff exercising the court's original jurisdiction. 0 2 Left unanswered,

99. This distinction has been completely overlooked by the majority of courts
analyzing the legal certainty test. For one of the few cases in which a court has
recognized the fine points of this analysis, see Essex Ins. Co. v. J&D Blackwell Enter.,
Inc., No. CIV. A.92-3721, 1993 WL 204109, at *2-*4 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1993), affd, 16
F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1993).
100. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,290-92 (1936).
101. Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. See, e.g., Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995)
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however, are the harder questions raised by removal of cases involving
indeterminate or lowball complaints. To resolve these issues, one must first
consider whether St. PaulMercury's legal certainty test can be reconciled with
the preponderance requirement set forth in McNutt.
2. Reconciling the Conflict Between
St. PaulMercury and McNutt
The analysis in the preceding Section shows that the removal statute mirrors
the jurisdictional requirements set forth in the diversity statute and attempts to
ensure that a defendant's access to federal court is roughly equivalent to the
plaintiffs right to the federal forum. 3 Simple logic, therefore, suggests that the
same jurisdictional inquiry should be applied regardless of which party invokes
the coures jurisdiction. The key questions are whether the parties are of diverse
citizenship and whether the amount in dispute exceeds $75,000. For reasons
explained more fully below, the McNutt standard is proper for reviewing the first
of these two requirements, but St. PaulMercury's legal certainty test is the more
appropriate standard for cases in which the amount in controversy is at issue.
Although the broad language used in McNutt seems to suggest that the
preponderance test applies to all jurisdictional inquiries, this broad
pronouncement was purely dictum and was implicitly rejected by the St. Paul
Mercury decision. The sole issue in McNutt concerned the burden of

(stating that the removing party bears the burden of establishing the facts necessary to
establish federal jurisdiction, but "[w]here the plaintiff has alleged a sum certain that
exceeds the requisite amount in controversy, that amount controls if made in good faith
... "and therefore, "[i]n order for a court to refuse jurisdiction 'it [must] appear to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount"'); Gafford v.
General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157 (6th Cir. 1993) (based upon the discussion in St.
PaulMercury regarding removal cases the Gaffordcourt stated, "it is equally evident that
the 'legal certainty' standard should apply to cases removed to federal court from state
court where the plaintiffs prayer for damages in the state suit exceeds the federal amountin-controversy requirement"); Albright v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 531 F.2d 132,

135-37 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,426 U.S. 907 (1976) (citing St. PaulMercury to justify a
more lenient standard when the defendant removes a case from state court based upon
the plaintiffs request for damages as compared with the level of scrutiny required when
the plaintiff invokes the courts jurisdiction by filing the suit directly in federal court);
Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753, 756 (E.D. Mich. 1990) ("[W]here the
state court complaint itself states damages in an amount sufficient to obtain federal
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, by way of removal, and the defendant does in fact
remove the case to federal court, it would make very good sense to require proof to a
legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover damages equal to or greater than the
jurisdictional amount.").
103. See supranotes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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production-i.e., which party had the burden of introducing evidence to go
forward with the jurisdictional inquiry. 4 The Court's enunciation of the
preponderance test unnecessarily went one step further, addressing the ultimate
burden of persuasion-i.e., the quantity of evidence required for a court to rule
in that party's favor when both sides have submitted contradicting evidence on
the question. 05
None of the prior Supreme Court cases discussed in McNutt addressed the
burden of persuasion. Instead, the cases focused on other procedural questions
0 6
such as: the type of pleading that must be filed to raise the jurisdictional issue;
whether trial courts had the authority to resolve jurisdictional disputes without
the intervention of the jury;0 7 and, if the question is decided by the court rather
than a jury, whether the decision was reviewable on appeal. 08 In Wetmore v.
Rymer, for example, the Court noted that the 1875 Act did not "prescribe any
particular mode in which the question of the jurisdiction is to be brought to the
attention of the court, nor how such question, when raised, shall be
determined."" ° The Court recognized that the inquiry "would usually depend
upon matters of fact," and, therefore, raised questions as to whether the inquiry
should be conducted by the court or the jury."10 The Court noted that "the court
might doubtless order the issue to be tried by the jury[,]" but it also
acknowledged that "the questions might arise in such a shape that the court
might consider and determine them without the intervention of a jury. And it
would appear to have been the intention of [C]ongress to leave the mode of
raising and trying such issues to the discretion of the trial judge."',
Allowing the court to conduct the jurisdictional inquiry makes sense
because it addresses two major concerns: (1) that the federal courts should not
adjudicate a case absent a sufficient showing that jurisdiction exists; and (2) that
the threshold determination ofjurisdiction should be made as quickly as possible
to avoid delays in the litigation or the unnecessary expense of preparing the case
in federal court only to have it remanded to state court after the parties are well

104. See supranote 85.
105. See supranote 85.
106. Anderson v. Watts, 138 U.S. 694, 698 (1891) ("Under the act of March 3,
1875 .... the objection to the jurisdiction upon a denial of the averment of citizenship

is not confined to a plea in abatement or a demurrer, but may be taken in the answer, and
the time at which it may be raised is not restricted.").
107. Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 568 (1915); Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S.
115, 120-21 (1898).
108. North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Soley, 257 U.S. 216, 221 (1921); Wetmore, 169 U.S.

at 121-22.
109. Wetmore, 169 U.S. at 120.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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into the litigation." 2 But in crafting a jurisdictional test, the courts must be
cognizant of a third major concern-that the jurisdictional inquiry should not
encroach upon the jury's province as arbiter of the merits of the case.
This latter issue does not arise in all jurisdictional disputes. Some of the
cases discussed in McNutt, for example, dealt with factual disputes regarding the
citizenship of the parties." 3 Resolution of the citizenship question has no
bearing on the merits of the case, but instead addresses an issue that relates
solely to jurisdiction. The court, therefore, can exercise its authority to resolve
the jurisdictional issue without usurping the jury's authority to resolve the
ultimate issues in the case. In these cases, it would seem logical for the court to
apply a preponderance standard to resolve the factual dispute.
A different case arises, however, when the jurisdictional facts are
intertwined with the merits of the action, as is the case with disputes concerning
the amount in controversy. The Supreme Court specifically addressed this
problem in its early decisions discussing the 1875 amendments to the Judiciary
Act."' Recognizing that "it is the peculiar function of the jury" to determine the
amount of damages in a case," 5 the Court emphasized that judicial inquiry
should be limited in nature so that courts, acting under the guise of determining
jurisdiction, do not deprive the parties of their right to ajury trial." 6 Thus, in
Smithers v. Smith, the Court stated that judges are forbidden to "interpose and try
a sufficient part of the controversy between the parties to satisfy [themselves]
that the plaintiff ought to recover less than the jurisdictional amount, and to
conclude, therefore, that the real controversy between the parties is concerning
a subject of less than the jurisdictional value ....

112. 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d
ed. 1985); see also Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. Partnership v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d
350, 351-52 (7th Cir. 1995).
113. Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1915); Anderson v. Watts, 138 U.S. 694
(1891).
114. Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645 (1907); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S.
550, 565 (1886).
115. Barry, 116 U.S. at 565.
116. Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645 ("For it must not be forgotten that where, in good
faith, one has brought into court a cause of action which, as stated by him, is clearly
within its jurisdiction, he has the right to try its merits in the manner provided by the
Constitution and law, and cannot be compelled to submit to a trial of another kind.").
117. Id.
at 644. The Barry Court similarly observed:
For nothing is better settled than that, in cases such as the present, and other
actions for torts where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable damages,
it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount by their verdict.
In Whipple v. Cumberland Manufg Co., 2 Story, 661, 670, Mr. Justice
STORY well expressed the rule on this subject that a verdict will not be set
aside in a case of tort for excessive damages 'unless the court can clearly see
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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That is exactly what would happen if a court were to resolve disputes
concerning the amount in controversy by using a preponderance of evidence
standard; the court would be substituting its judgment for that of the jury on a
question that goes to the merits of the case as well as to the court's jurisdiction.
The legal certainty test, on the other hand, allows the court to determine its
jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation without encroaching upon the jury's
province as arbiter of damages. It does so, as the author of one treatise observes,
by adopting a relatively low burden of proof which "recognizes that the question
of whether the jurisdictional
amount is satisfied is separate from a decision on
' 8
the merits of the case."
No one will know with certainty how much money the case involves until it
is decided on the merits. But the court's jurisdiction cannot be held in limbo
until that point; the jurisdictional question normally will be a threshold matter.
Moreover, equating the jurisdictional question with the merits would mean
that a judgment for the defendant (or a judgment for less than the
jurisdictional amount for plaintiff) would require a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, rather than ajudgment on the merits. Thus, while a federal court
has the duty to assess subject matter jurisdiction throughout the litigation, the
legal certainty test recognizes that the amount in controversy issue cannot be
tied ultimately to the merits.
Thus, so long as a plaintiff satisfies the legal certainty test, jurisdiction
attaches." 9

that the jury have committed some very gross and palpable error, or have
acted under some improper bias, influence or prejudice, or have totally
mistaken the rules of law by which the damages are to be regulated,'-that is,
'unless the verdict is so excessive or outrageous,' with reference to all the
circumstances of the case, 'as to demonstrate that the jury have acted against
the rules of law, or have suffered their passions, their prejudices, or their
perverse disregard ofjustice to mislead them.' In no case is it permissible for
the court to substitute itself for the jury, and compel a compliance on the part
of the latter with its own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and
measure of that justice, which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional
tribunal to award.
Barry, 116 U.S. at 565.
118. 1 WILLIAM A. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,

0.92[1] (2d ed.

1994).
119. 1 id The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in the context of a federal
question case, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), decided ten years after McNutt. At
issue in Bell was whether the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a violation of Fourth
and Fifteenth Amendment rights. The defendants argued that there was no federal cause
of action and, therefore, the case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
Jurisdiction... is not defeated ...
by the possibility that the averments might
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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The Supreme Court, in fact, applied the legal certainty test in Wetmore,
where the lower court had dismissed the case for failing to satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement. After stating that the courts have discretion to
determine such issues without the intervention of the jury, the Supreme Court
considered whether the lower court had met the standard enunciated in Barry v.
Edmunds'20 "that a suit cannot be properly dismissed by a circuit court as not
substantially involving a controversy within its jurisdiction, unless the facts,
when made to appear on the record, create a legal certainty of that conclusion
"121

fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For
it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a
judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be
granted is a question of law and... must be decided after and not before the
court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later
exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations of the complaint do
not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits,
not for want ofjurisdiction....
Id at 682-83.
The Court recognized, however, that such cases could be dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds if the plaintiffs federal claim "appears to be immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous." Id. at 683.
See also Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1050 (1995)
(stating that jurisdictional facts need not be determined with finality at the jurisdictional
stage; rather, "[n]ormal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of
the case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements ... and any
litigation of a contested subject matter jurisidictional fact issue occurs in a comparatively
summary procedure before ajudge alone (as distinct from litigation of the same fact issue
as an element of the cause of action, if the claim survives the jurisdictional objection)")
(citations omitted). Not surprisingly, this standard parallels part of the legal certainty test
enunciated in St. PaulMercury. See supratext accompanying note 97.
120. See supranotes 74-79 and acco.mpanying text.
121. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 128 (1898). In fact, Wetmore quotes
Barry's entire explanation of what the standard requires:
In making [an order dismissing a case for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount], the circuit court exercises a legal, and not a personal, discretion,
which must be exerted in view of the facts sufficiently proven, and controlled
by fixed rules of law. It might happen that the judge, on the trial or hearing
of the cause, would receive impressions amounting to a moral certainty that
it does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within the
jurisdiction of the court. But upon such a personal conviction, however
strong, he would not be at liberty to act, unless the facts on which the
persuasion is based, when made distinctly to appear on the record, create a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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McNutt failed to acknowledge this point, however, when it made the
blanket statement that jurisdictional fact disputes were to be resolved by a
preponderance standard. 22 Unfortunately, many federal courts have embraced
McNutt's preponderance test without analyzing its legal foundations. As the
preceding analysis suggests, the preponderance test might be appropriate when
the disputed facts relate solely to jurisdiction-such as questions concerning the
diversity of citizenship of the parties. When the jurisdictional facts are
intertwined with the merits of the case, however, the Supreme Court's decisions
in Barry, Wetmore, and St. PaulMercury indicate that the legal certainty test
should be used.
Knowing the purpose behind the legal certainty test also helps resolve a
second question concerning the jurisdictional inquiry. As explained above, the
test requires a two-part review: (1) whether it is legally impossible for the
plaintiff to recover in excess of the jurisdictional amount because the cause of
action limits recovery to a fixed amount; and (2) whether it is factually
impossible for the plaintiff to recover such an amount-i.e., whether the amount
is beyond a reasonable expectation of recovery in cases where the amount of
damages is not limited by the cause of action. But how does a court determine
what constitutes a "reasonable expectation"? The answer can be found in court
rulings on post-trial motions for a new trial.
One of the most frequently cited grounds for seeking a new trial-or a
remittitur-is that the jury's verdict was legally excessive. In that situation, much
like the jurisdictional inquiry into the amount in controversy, the court must be
careful not to substitute its judgment for that of the jury regarding the proper
amount of damages. It logically follows that the courts should employ the same
standard for the jurisdictional inquiry as it uses for a post-trial motion-i.e., the
court should determine whether a jury could reasonably enter a verdict in excess
of the federal minimum based upon the facts alleged in the complaint or,
conversely, whether such an award would be set aside as excessive. 23
24
An example ofthe appropriate inquiry can be found in Herbertv. Rainey,1
where the plaintiff brought an action alleging that the smoke, flames, gases, and

legal certainty of the conclusion based on them.
Id, at 122.
122. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
123. Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996), the federal courts should consult state law for
a more precise test of what constitutes an excessive verdict. In Gasperini,a sharply
divided Court concluded that a New York rule concerning the reasonableness ofjury
verdicts was substantive in nature. Thus, under the doctrine of Erie RailroadCo. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity cases must apply the
state rule of law rather than the federal standard. Id. at 2219-21.
124. 54 F. 248 (W.D. Pa. 1892).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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heat from a neighboring landowner's coke ovens rendered the plaintiffs land
valueless."2 In determining whether the value of the land exceeded the federal
jurisdictional amount, the court noted that estimates given by the defendant's
witnesses differed greatly from those given by the plaintiffs witnesses. But the
court noted that such differences are not uncommon when the value of real estate
is involved. The court ultimately held that the jurisdictional prerequisite had
been satisfied because "upon the whole evidence ajury or a master might well
find the plaintiffs property to be worth over $2,000. We are then of the opinion
that this suit does 'really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy
properly within the jurisdiction' of the court .... ,"126
3. Flaws in the Arguments Rejecting the Legal Certainty Test
A number of courts have rejected the use of the legal certainty test for
removal cases involving indeterminate or lowball complaints because, in their
view, St. PaulMercwy suggests that the test is applicable only when the plaintiff
has pleaded against his or her chosen forum-i.e., when the complaint contains
an unequivocal demand or prayer for relief in an amount that exceeds the federal
jurisdictional minimum. The Sixth Circuit explains its reasoning as follows:
The "legal certainty" test in removal cases arose in a context where the
plaintiffs prayer for damages in state court exceeded the federal amount-incontroversy requirement. In such a case as that, it is proper to presume that
the plaintiffs prayer is an appropriate presentation of potential damages
because the damages sought are against the plaintiffs interests. There can be
no such presumption where there is no specific prayer for damages. Thus, the
"legal certainty" test should not be applied to situations ... where damages
are unspecified. 27
Under this theory, jurisdiction would exist only in the two easy cases that
were addressed in St. PaulMercury--originaljurisdiction diversity cases and the
few removal cases where the state court complaint expressly demands a sum

125. Id. at 249-50.
126. Id. at 252.
127. Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 160 (6th Cir. 1993); see also
Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997); Garza v.
Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
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certain that exceeds the federal minimum." 8 This viewpoint, however,
misinterprets the St. PaulMercury analysis.
As described above,'29 the St. PaulMercury decision begins with the basic
premise that the legal certainty test applies in original jurisdiction cases-cases
in which the plaintiffs have filed their actions directly in federal court and,
therefore, demanded damages in amounts in excess of the federal jurisdictional
minimum. The opinion suggests that the plaintiffs demand is entitled to even
greater deference in a removal case when the state court complaint includes a
request for relief that brings the action within the federal court's jurisdiction. 3
Thus, the Court recognized a strong presumption that the plaintiffs damage
estimate was made in good faith because it is contrary to the plaintiffs interest
in remaining in state court.'
Obviously this presumption does not apply when the plaintiff has not
included a specific request for damages in the state-filed complaint or has
requested damages that fall below the federal minimum. The absence of this
presumption, however, does not totally preclude the application of the legal
certainty test. To the contrary, it simply puts the defendant in precisely the same
position as a plaintiff who filed the action directly in federal court in the first
place. In both cases, the party seeking federal jurisdiction supplies an estimate
of the amount in controversy. Accordingly, the same judicial inquiry standard
should be used to determine whether the jurisdictional prerequisite has been met.
This makes sense when one considers that the amount in controversy is a
two-sided coin. It reflects not only the amount of damages that the plaintiff
expects to receive in the case, but also the extent of the defendant's
exposure-the financial detriment that the defendant is likely to incur if the
plaintiff wins. In the easy cases discussed in St. Paul Mercury, the plaintiff
estimated that the recoverable damages were greater than the federal threshold.
But in removal cases involving an indeterminate complaint the defendant alleges
that his exposure in the case is likely to exceed the federal threshold if the
plaintiff succeeds on the merits. Similarly, in removal cases involving lowball

128. See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Mhe St. PaulMercury legal certainty test is applicable in two types of cases: (1) those
brought in the federal court in which the plaintiff has filed a good faith complaint
alleging damages in excess of the required jurisdictional minimum and (2) those brought
in the state court in which the plaintiff has filed any complaint alleging damages in
excess of the required federal jurisdictional minimum.").
129. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
131. See supra text accompanying note 100; see also Gafford, 997 F.2d at 160
("[I]t is proper to presume that the plaintiffs prayer is an appropriate presentation of
potential damages because the damages sought are against the plaintiffs forum-selection
interests.").
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complaints, the defendant alleges that the plaintiffs demand does not fairly
reflect the defendant's real exposure in the case because state pleading rules do
not bind the plaintiff to the amount of that demand.
The legal certainty test provides the proper inquiry regardless of which
party asserts that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied. The test is not intended
to "give the benefit of the doubt" to one particular party's demand for damages,
as some courts have suggested,' but instead requires the court to conduct an
independent inquiry as to how much money is ultimately at stake in the matter.
In making this determination, the court's review focuses on the nature of the
plaintiffs cause of action and the nature of the damages that are alleged; if there
is a "reasonable expectation" that the plaintiff will recover in excess of $75,000
if the claim succeeds, the jurisdictional inquiry is satisfied. Thus, it makes no
difference whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who has alleged that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
In cases involving lowball complaints, however, some courts insist that
great deference is owed to the plaintiffs damage request because the plaintiff is
the master of the complaint and, therefore, should be entitled to have the case
heard in the forum of his or her choice. But this viewpoint is contrary to the
mandate of the removal statute, which gives non-resident defendants the right to
have the action heard in federal court so long as the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction are present. Thus, if the defendant can prove that his or her exposure
in the case exceeds the federal minimum, the removal statute on its face defers
to the defendant's choice of forum notwithstanding the plaintiffs desire to remain
in state court.
Nevertheless, several courts have suggested that the plaintiffs status as
master of the complaint means that the courts should give controlling weight to
the plaintiffs estimate of damages. 33 In support of these views, the courts rely
upon language from St. PaulMercury which suggests that federal courts must
defer to the amount claimed by the plaintiff as being the value of the matter in
dispute because the plaintiff has the right to avoid removal by "suing for less
than the jurisdictional amount... ."134 Similarly, the Supreme Court stated in

132. See Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. Partnership v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350,

350 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that the legal certainty test was intended to allow courts
to make the jurisdictional inquiry "expeditiously and cheaply" by simplifying the inquiry
and giving "the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt").
133. This argument, of course, applies only to cases in which the complaint
includes a demand for a specific sum that falls below the federal minimum; it is irrelevant
to the situation where the plaintiff has failed to provide an estimate of the damages in the
complaint. "Where a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand for damages,. . .there
is simply no estimate of damages to which a court may-defer." Tapscott v. MS Dealer
Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996).
134. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,294 (1938).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

39

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 1
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 62

Lee v. Watson 35 that in determining the amount in controversy, "[t]he damages
or prayer for judgment must be regarded, inasmuch as the plaintiff may seek a
recovery for less than the sum to which he appears entitled by the allegations in
the body of the declaration."
What these Supreme Court decisions are referring to, however, is the
"general rule that plaintiff may in his prayer waive a part of the recovery to
which, according to the averments of the complaint, he is entitled, and thus avoid
removal."' 36 In other words, "the injured party may, if he sees fit, waive his right
to recover full damages, and in that case the litigation involves only the amount
which he seeks to recover.""' This waiver rule, however, must be read in the
context of the pleading rules that existed at that time. Under the common law,
a plaintiff"could not recover anything other than the relief specifically requested
in the ad damnum clause of his complaint."'38 Thus, under those circumstances,
the plaintiffs demand did in fact represent the true amount in controversy
because the plaintiff was bound by the amount demanded in the prayer for
relief.'39
That is no longer the case following the enactment of Rule 54(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 and the state pleading rules patterned
after that rule. As pointed out above, 4° Rule 54(c) provides that "every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered

135. 68 U.S. 337, 339-40 (1863).
136. Collins v. Twin Falls North Side Land & Water Co., 204 F. 134, 135 (D.
Idaho 1913).
137. Smith v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 53 N.W. 173, 173 (N.D. 1892).
138. 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 134
(2d ed. 1983); see also Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 375 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citing Benjamin J. Shipman, COMMON LAW PLEADING 223 487-89 (3d ed.
1923) for the position that "[a]t common law, a statement of the amount claimed was
required [in the plaintiffs complaint], and was an upper limit on recovery"); Starke v.
Hoerning, 206 F. 1006, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1913) (stating that "no larger sum can be
recovered in a suit than the amount claimed in the writ").
139. That was precisely the case in Iowa CentralRailway Co. v. Bacon, 236 U.S.
305 (1915). The body of the plaintiffs complaint for wrongful death alleged that the
decedenfs estate had been damaged in the sum of $10,000 but the prayer for relief asked
only for the sum of $1,990. The defendant attempted to remove to federal court, arguing
that the amount in controversy exceeded the federal jurisdictional threshold of $2,000.

However, the state court denied the application for removal, holding that the amount in
controversy was less than $2,000. The Supreme Court upheld the decision, noting that
"[t]he state court had authority to determine the effect of the prayer to the petition, and
it decided that, under the petition, no more than the amount prayed for could be
recovered in the action, notwithstanding the statement that the estate had suffered damage
in the sum $10,000." Id. at 309.
140. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's
pleadings." Thus, a plaintiff is no longer bound by the amount demanded in the
prayer for relief and the defendant's actual exposure in the case could be much
higher. Accordingly, the plaintiffs demand is not dispositive of the amount in
controversy.
The two federal circuit courts that have addressed this issue have
recognized that the plaintiffs demand is not the conclusive measure of the value
of the case. Thus, they have held that a defendant may be entitled to remove a
case to federal court notwithstanding the plaintiffs demand for a specific sum
that is below the federal minimum. For purposes of determining the amount in
controversy in this situation, however, the courts ultimately concluded that the
legal certainty test is too lenient and, instead, have imposed upon the defendant
a much higher burden of establishing jurisdiction.14 ' In essence, although these
courts have refused to recognize the plaintiffs demand as the conclusive measure
of damages, they are still willing to give the demand a considerable degree of
deference.
The key difference between the Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit standards
is in the degree of deference they would recognize. As set forth above, the
Eleventh Circuit's standard places a heavy burden on the defendant to prove that
jurisdiction exists despite plaintiffs specific request for an amount below the
jurisdictional threshold. 42 Among its reasons for adopting a higher standard was
its view that
[e]very lawyer is an officer of the court. And, in addition to his duty of
diligently researching his client's case, he always has a duty of candor to the
tribunal. So, plaintiffs claim, when it is specific and in a pleading signed by
a lawyer, deserves deference and a presumption of truth. We will not
assume-unless given reason to do so-that plaintiffs counsel has falsely
represented, or simply does not appreciate, the value of his clients case.
Instead, we will assume that plaintiffs counsel best knows the value of his
client's case and that counsel is engaging in no deception. We will further
presume that plaintiffs counsel understands that, because federal removal
jurisdiction is in part determined by the amount of damages a plaintiff seeks,
the counsel's choices and representations about damages have important legal

consequences and, therefore, raise significant ethical implications for a court
officer.'

141. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995); Bums v. Windsor
Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092 (1lth Cir. 1994); see supranotes 42-47 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.

143. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. The court noted that:
The duty of candor goes beyond the moral duty imposed on counsel by

ethical codes or good conscience. Under Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure
11, counsel must sign each pleading, motion or other document he submits to
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The Fifth Circuit's preponderance standard, on the other hand, is less
deferential to the plaintiff. In rejecting the strict standard adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit stated that such a test "seems to conflict with
our past decisions that have stated that the standard for determining jurisdictional
amount should favor 'those parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
district court.""' In addition, the strict standard
fails adequately to protect defendants from plaintiffs who seek to manipulate
their state pleadings to avoid federal court while retaining the possibility of
recovering greater damages in state court following remand. This court has
spoken adamantly of"preventing the plaintiff from being able to destroy the
jurisdictional choice
that Congress intended to afford a defendant in the
1 45
removal statute.1

The Eleventh Circuit also acknowledged that a plaintiff strategically could
avoid federal jurisdiction by initially requesting a specific sum in damages less
than the federal jurisdictional amount, but later amending the claim to seek in
excess of that amount after the one-year time limitation in section 1446(b). The
court declined to place much emphasis on this potential for abuse, however,
stating that "such a result (if it is not good policy) should be remedied by
congressional and not judicial action... ."I46 Moreover, the court stated that
we are not convinced that [C]ongress would find the result [the defendant]
fears (that is, an amendment for greater damages after the one year deadline
for removal) to be bad. The Commentary to the 1988 Revisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) shows that [C]ongress knew when it passed the one year bar on
removal that some plaintiffs would attempt to defeat diversity by fraudulently
(and temporarily) joining a non-diverse party. In that case, as long as there

is some possibility that a non-diverse joined party could be liable in the
action, there is no federal jurisdiction. But, under section 1446(b), if, after
one year, the plaintiff dismisses the non-diverse defendant, the [remaining]
defendant cannot remove. So, a plaintiff could defeat jurisdiction by joining
a non-diverse party and dismissing him after the deadline. Congress has

the court. His signature is a "certificate by him that he has read the
[submission]; [and] that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is good ground to support it. ..." The rule also states that "[flor a
willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action."
Id. n.5.
144. De Aguilar,47 F.3d at 1411 (quoting dissenting opinion in Kliebert v. Upjohn
Co., 915 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jolly, J., dissenting), vacatedforrehearingen
banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed,947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991)).
145. ld.(citations omitted).
146. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 n.4.
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recognized and accepted that, in some circumstances, plaintiff can and will
intentionally avoid federal jurisdiction.' 47
The Eleventh Circuit stated that a lesser standard, such as the legal certainty
test, would unacceptably broaden federal jurisdiction because it would allow
removal "anytime a plaintiff sued for less than the jurisdictional amount but there
remained even a possibility that she would amend her claim or be awarded more
than she pleaded ... ...
4'The mere fact that the plaintiff "could" recover more,
given the power of the court to award more than what was requested in the
complaint, "is not enough to prove jurisdiction in the face of plaintiffs specific
pleading."'4

147. Id at 1097 n.12. This statement requires some clarification. In explaining the
new one-year limit on removing diversity actions, the House Report acknowledged that
the change would result in "a modest curtailment in access to diversity jurisdiction."
H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Congress, 2d Sess., at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032-33. The report suggested that the change was necessary,
however, because the current system allowed removal whenever non-diverse parties were
eliminated in the state proceeding-notwithstanding the fact that substantial progress had
been made in the state court and that a removal late in the game would result in
considerable delay and disruption. To illustrate the problem, the report stated that
"[s]ettlement with a diversity-destroying defendant on the eve oftrial, for example, may
permit the remaining defendants to remove."
The Commentary cited by Burns discussed a very different scenario-one in which
a plaintiff, as a matter of strategy, joins a nondiverse defendant "whom the plaintiff does
not really intend to sue but who is arguably liable on the claim and hence properly joined
under state law. The plaintiff can then just wait a year and drop that party, polishing the
action to just the point desired and at the same time dissolving the threat of federal
jurisdiction." David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1446, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1446, at 316-17 (1994). The Commentary then concluded: "The one-year
cutoff therefore has an anti-diversity ring to it. Congress acknowledged this, but called
it a 'modest curtailment."' Id. at 317.
In short, it was the Commentary-and not necessarily Congress-that acknowledged
the potential for "tactical chicanery" under the new one-year cutoff. The House report
merely acknowledged the fact that the new one-year limit would modestly curtail access
to diversity jurisdiction. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit goes too far in suggesting that
Congress "knew when it passed the one year ban on removal that some plaintiffs would
attempt to defeat diversity by fraudulently ...joining a non-diverse party."
148. Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d at 1092, 1096-97 (11th Cir. 1994).
149. Id.at 1097. A federal district court recently expounded on this argument,
observing that when a plaintiff expressly seeks damages that are less than the federal
minimum, the defendant cannot force the plaintiff to take more. In re Amino Acid
Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1181, 1185-86 (N.D. 111. 1996). Thus, if the
plaintiffs complaint states that "neither plaintiff nor any other member of the class seeks
damages exceeding [$50,000]," that provision must be read "as unequivocally
committing [the plaintiff] and each other class member to the collection of no more than
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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This argument, which was echoed by the Fifth Circuit, 5 ' misconstrues the
inquiry required under the legal certainty test as requiring only a "possibility"
that the plaintiff will recover in excess of the federal minimum. To the contrary,
as discussed above, the legal certainty test requires the party invoking the court's
jurisdiction to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff can recover
in excess of the federal jurisdictional minimum. The federal court does not defer
to the party's allegation of the amount in controversy but, instead, considers
whether a reasonable jury could enter a judgment on the plaintiffs claim in an
amount exceeding the federal minimum-or, conversely, whether ajudgment in
that amount would be set aside as being excessive.'
As explained above, this standard reflects the special circumstance
presented by cases in which the precise measure of damages is not fixed by law
but instead left to the discretion of the fact finder. Thus, when the plaintiff
alleged that his or her damages exceeded the federal minimum, the courts
deferred to that amount unless it was clear that the estimate was beyond a
reasonable expectation. This same policy should apply to a defendant's
allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal threshold. If the
jury could legally return a verdict in excess of the federal minimum, then the
defendant has met his or her burden of demonstrating that the amount in
controversy is sufficient to trigger the federal court's jurisdiction.
Obviously a plaintiff should be able to remain in state court if the plaintiff
is willing to forego recovery in excess of $75,000 through a binding stipulation
or other procedural mechanism.'
In that case, the amount in controversy
clearly is less than the federal minimum. But if the plaintiff merely pleads a
specific amount that falls below the federal minimum and is not legally limited
to that amount, the defendant should be allowed to establish that his ultimate

$50,000. Burns... teaches that the possibility of a plaintiffs change of heart in the
future does not affect today's duty to remand." Id at 1186. In short, in this court's view,
the propriety of removal depends upon what the plaintiff has specifically requested-and
not whether the plaintiff has the ability to amend the complaint at a later date to request
a greater sum or whether a court could award more than the plaintiff requested.
150. See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
151. This standard cuts both ways. As the Seventh Circuit recently observed when
reviewing a plaintiffs demand in a diversity action: "It does not follow that the court
must accept the plaintiffs perspective and proceed to adjudicate on the merits every case
in which the lawyers can keep straight faces when making their presentations." Anthony
v. Security Pac. Fin. Serv., Inc., 75 F.3d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, regardless of
whether the plaintiff or defendant has brought the case to federal court, the court has the
duty to inquire into the reasonableness of the party's claim that the amount in controversy
exceeds the federal minimum.
152. See infranotes 200-16 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1

44

Noble-Allgire: Noble-Allgire: Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determined
1997]

REMOVAL OFDIVERSITYACTIONS

exposure in the case-and, hence, the amount in controversy-is greater than the
federal minimum.
Various other arguments have been offered as to why the defendant should
be held to a higher standard in removal cases involving indeterminate or lowball
complaints, but none is persuasive. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, contends
that the defendants right to remove is not on equal footing with plaintiffs right
to choose his forum.' "[U]nlike the rules applied when plaintiff has filed suit
in federal court with a claim that, on its face, satisfies the jurisdictional amount,
removal statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash
about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand."' 54 This
statement, however, is based on a misconception about the level of review
required of diversity cases.
Certainly, removal statutes are to be construed narrowly.' At the heart of
this rule is a sound respect for the principles of federalism-i.e., a "[c]oncem
about encroaching on a state court's right to decide cases properly before it...
,1s Thus, where there is any doubt as to federal jurisdiction, the courts have

held that such doubt should be construed in favor of remanding the case to the
state court.' 7
What the Eleventh Circuit overlooks is the fact that the statute providing for
original jurisdiction in diversity cases is subject to strict construction for the
same reasons.' 5 8 As the Supreme Court explained in an original jurisdiction

153. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994).

156. Cole v. Great Atl. & Pae. Tea Co., 728 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (E.D. Ky. 1990).
It must always be borne in mind that a federal court is a court of limited
jurisdiction and can only entertain those actions which fall squarely within its
jurisdiction as that jurisdiction is stated by the act or acts of Congress in
conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution. This court has a
responsibility to accept jurisdiction in all proper cases. It has a greater
obligation to protect the jurisdiction of the State court, both by reason of
comity to that court and fairness to litigants who have chosen it as a forum.
Id (quoting Walsh v. American Airlines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 514, 515 (E.D. Ky. 1967)).
157. Id.; Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc. 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Courts
should interpret the removal statute narrowly and presume that the plaintiff may choose

his or her forum. Any doubt regarding jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of the
states ... ."); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985)
("Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the
continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly
construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.").
158. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) ("[T]he
policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is
one calling for the strict construction of such legislation."); Indianapolis v. Chase Natl
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diversity case: "The policy of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction upon
the district courts calls for its strict construction.... Accordingly, if a plaintiffs
allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff
bears the burden of supporting the allegations by competent proof."'5 9
Moreover, although removal statutes are subject to narrow construction,
several courts have noted that "there is a countervailing concern that dictates that
a federal court 'be cautious about remand, lest it erroneously deprive defendant
Thus, if the defendant can sufficiently
of the right to a federal forum.""'
Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941) (strict construction required because "[t]he dominant note
in the successive enactments of Congress relating to diversity jurisdiction is one of
jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to state sensitiveness, and of relieving the federal
courts of the overwhelming burden of 'business that intrinsically belongs to the state
courts' in order to keep them free for their distinctive federal business"); Healy v. Ratta,
292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("policy of the statute calls for its strict construction"); Packard
v. Provident Natl Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (3d Cir. 1993) (diversity statute "must
be narrowly construed so as not to frustrate the congressional purpose behind it: to keep
the diversity caseload of the federal courts under some modicum of control"); Crowley
v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir.1983) ("Statutes conferring diversity jurisdiction
are to be strictly construed."); Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092
(9th Cir. 1983) (congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction is to be strictly construed).
The Supreme Courts explanation of this policy demonstrates that it applies equally
to diversity cases and removal cases:
From the beginning suits between citizens of different states, or involving
federal questions, could neither be brought in the federal courts nor removed
to them, unless the value of the matter in controversy was more than a
specified amount. Cases involving lesser amounts have been left to be dealt
with exclusively by state courts, except that judgment of the highest court of
a state adjudicating a federal right may be reviewed by this court. Pursuant
to this policy the jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been
narrowed by successive acts of Congress, which have progressively increased
the jurisdictional amount. The policy of the statute calls for its strict
construction. The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution
(Amendment 10), to provide for the determination of controversies in their
courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the
judiciary sections of the Constitution (article 3).... Due regard for the
rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal
courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the
precise limits which the statute has defined.
Healy, 292 U.S. at 269-70 (citations and footnote omitted).
159. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442,446 (1942).
160. BoIling v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 900 F. Supp. 400, 405 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
(quoting 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 21819 (2d ed. 1985)). Indeed, district courts should exercise even greater care in ruling on
a motion to remand a removal case because such rulings are not subject to federal
appellate review. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text; 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal minimum, the
case should remain in federal court notwithstanding the plaintiffs express claim
for a smaller sum. "There is no reason to value the plaintiffs right to select a
state court forum as a more worthy consideration than the nonresident
defendant's statutory right to seek an impartial tribunal." '' Indeed, that would
be contrary to the very purpose of the removal statute.
Other courts have suggested that a different standard should be applied in
a removal case because of concerns about expanding federal diversity
jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit, for example, acknowledged that defendants have
a statutorily created right to remove an action to federal court to avoid the local
prejudices of state courts.'62 At the same time, however, the court noted that
Congress has indicated a desire to limit access to federal courts in diversity cases
by imposing, and periodically increasing, the amount in controversy
requirement. 6 "Thus, by statute, Congress has offered defendants a relatively
neutral forum and has policed the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court
system, balancing the interests at play in the legislation it passes.""6 The court
ultimately concluded that the preponderance of evidence test best accommodated
those two interests.

(1994).
161. Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jolly, J.
dissenting); see also DeAguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995) ("This
court has spoken adamantly of'preventing the plaintiff from being able to destroy the
jurisdictional choice that Congress intended to afford a defendant in the removal
statute.'").
162. Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158-59 (6th Cir. 1993).
163. Id.
164. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

47

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 1
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 62

What this argument overlooks is the applicability of the amount in
controversy requirement to all types of diversity cases, not just those removed
from state court. It affects plaintiffs who file their actions directly in federal
court as well as defendants who seek to remove a state-filed complaint. 6 The
Sixth Circuit gave no reason why the desire to restrict diversity cases would
require a different standard for defendants than that applied to plaintiffs. Rather,
the court's decision seems to rest solely upon the argument that the legal
certainty test is appropriate only when the plaintiff has given a specific damage
figure in the complaint, thus triggering the presumption that the plaintiffs
estimate is correct. This rationale should be rejected for the reasons stated
above.' 66
In sum, there is no persuasive reason why the courts should apply a stricter
standard to the defendants estimate of damages in a removal case than the court
would apply to the plaintiffs estimate of damages in a complaint filed directly
in federal court. To the contrary, the language of the diversity and removal
statutes puts defendants and plaintiffs on equal footing with respect to the right
to be heard in federal court. Thus, in any type of diversity case or removal case
based upon diversity, the courts should require the same standard for establishing
jurisdiction: the party invoking the court's jurisdiction should bear the burden of
establishing (1) that it is not legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover in
excess of the jurisdictional amount-i.e., that the plaintiffs cause of action does
not limit recovery to a fixed amount below the federal minimum; and (2) that in
cases where the amount of damages is not limited by the cause of action, it is not
factually impossible for the plaintiff to recover such an amount-i.e., that the
amount is not beyond a reasonable expectation of recovery. To make this
"reasonable expectation" determination, the court must consider whether a jury
could reasonably enter a verdict in excess of the federal minimum based upon
the facts alleged in the complaint or, conversely, whether such an award would
be set aside as excessive under the applicable state standard.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER THE
CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME
Aside from the confusion surrounding the proper standard to be applied in
the jurisdictional inquiry, the mismatch between state pleading rules and federal
jurisdictional requirements also presents awkward procedural problems. One of
the first issues that a defendant may encounter relates to the proper timing of the
notice of removal. Once that hurdle is cleared, the court must decide what
procedural mechanisms it will employ to determine whether the defendant has

165. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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established the requisite amount in controversy. These procedural issues and the
varying judicial responses to them are described below, with a proposed
statutory remedy suggested in Part IV.
A. Timing of the Notice ofRemoval
Section 1446(b) of the removal statute provides that the notice of removal
generally must be filed within thirty days after the defendant receives the
complaint or summons in the state court action. 67 However, the statute also
provides that
[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or
other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which
is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the
basis of [diversity] jurisdiction ...
more than 1 year after commencement of
the action.'68
These provisions present a procedural quandary for defendants served with
indeterminate and lowball complaints. If the plaintiff has failed to allege a
specific amount of damages in the complaint (or has alleged damages that are
less than $75,000 but the defendant believes the amount is greater than that
sum), the defendant must decide whether to immediately file a notice of removal
based upon the defendant's own assessment that the amount in controversy
exceeds the federal jurisdictional requirement or whether it would be preferable
to wait until a later pleading or document establishes the amount in controversy.
Each course of action poses significant risks-a "Hobson's choice," as one
court described it. 69 If the defense attorney waits until the amount in
controversy can be verified, there is a risk that plaintiffs counsel may claim
defendant's noncompliance with the thirty-day timetable prescribed for removal
by section 1446(b). 170 On the other hand, filing a prompt notice of removal

'167. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) ("The notice of removal of a civil action or
proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of
summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is
not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.").
168. Id.
169. Foster v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48, 53 (3d Cir.
1993).
170. Id. at 52-53 ("On the one hand, if defendants wait until the receipt of a
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creates a risk that a court will find the removal premature because federal
jurisdiction has not yet been established.'
Some courts have relied upon the second part of section 1446(b) to hold
that when the plaintiffs prayer for relief is ambiguous, the defendant is not
required to file a notice of removal immediately but, instead, may try to clarify
the plaintiffs demand through interrogatories or receiving some other "paper"
indicating the amount in controversy. 7 2 In rejecting the plaintiffs argument that
the thirty-day removal period was triggered by the filing of the complaint itself,
the Fifth Circuit stated that the removal clock begins to run "from the defendant's
receipt of the initial pleading only when that pleading affirmatively reveals on
its face that the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the minimum
jurisdictional amount of the federal court."' 73
Not all courts agree, however. Some have held that the thirty-day clock
begins to run from receipt of the initial pleading if it is fairly apparent from the
complaint itself--or could be determined with due diligence-that the amount in
controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional minimum. 74 "Because state courts
complaint, they risk a federal court finding they had actual knowledge of removability
or diversity prior to receiving the complaint, thus rendering their notice time barred.").
171. Id at 53 ("On the other hand, if defendants rely on what they actually know
and remove prior to receiving a complaint or other formal court document, they risk
plaintiffs' filing a motion to quash removal as premature. Thus, defendants have at best
a Hobson's choice.").
172. Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 967 (1993); see also Rowe v. Marder, 750 F. Supp. 718, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1990)
(holding that initial pleading did not begin thirty-day removal period because it did not
allege a specific amount of damages--even though the defendant probably knew that the
damages would exceed the federal minimum), affd, 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir. 1991);

Rollwitz v. Burlington N. R.R., 507 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D.Mont. 1981) (collecting cases
in which courts have "found that the running of the time period for seeking removal
began only when it could be ascertained from 'other papers' that the requisite amount was
in controversy").
173. Chapman,969 F.2d at 163.

174. McCraw v. Lyons, 863 F. Supp. 430, 433-34 (W.D. Ky. 1994) (holding that
plaintiffs request for damages for personal injury, medical expenses, mental suffering,
emotional distress and punitive damages and costs "should have alerted Defendant that
Plaintiff was seeking an amount in excess of the $50,000 required to attain federal court
jurisdiction"); Marler v. Amoco Oil Co., 793 F. Supp. 656, 659 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (finding
that complaint, as well as plaintiffs' pre-litigation demand letters describing their damages

in detail, "provided defendant the necessary information with which to research and
ascertain that more than $50,000 was in controversy"); Knudsen v. Samuels, 715 F.
Supp. 1505, 1507 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding that removal time period was triggered by
complaint, which clearly stated that the dispute involved a contract for the purchase of
items valued at $124,000); Turner v. Wilson Foods Corp., 711 F. Supp. 624, 626 (N.D.
Ga. 1989) (holding that even though initial pleading did not specify the amount of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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are well-equipped to handle diversity cases, there is no reason to allow a
defendant additional time [to file the removal notice] if the presence of grounds
for removal is unambiguous given the defendant's knowledge and the claims
made in the initial complaint."'17 In other words, these courts take the position
that the plaintiffs answers to interrogatories would not be a "paper from which
it may first be ascertained" that the case is removable because the complaint
itself provides such information.
Based upon this logic, some courts have held that the defendant has a duty
"to assess and ascertain the amount in controversy within the 30-day time limit
for removal."' 176 That deadline may be impossible to meet, however, under the
discovery rules of many states. Even if a defendant immediately were to serve
interrogatories or requests to admit upon the plaintiff, many states give the
opposing party thirty days or more in which to answer interrogatories2 77 The
defendant, therefore, either must hope that the plaintiff will respond well before
the ordinary deadline or, in the alternative, must seek a court order to shorten the
time period.

damages, it put defendant on notice of an amount exceeding the federal jurisdiction
requisite because it alleged severe bums, permanent scarring, pain and suffering, and
lifelong medical expenses); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 540, 542 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (holding that defendant should have known action was removable based upon
initial complaint alleging serious personal injuries); Mielke v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 F.
Supp. 851, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that defendant insurance company should
have known that initial complaint was removable because plaintiff had previously
presented the insurance company with medical bills that totaled more than the $10,000
jurisdictional minimum).
175. McCraw,863 F. Supp. at 434; see also Mielke, 472 F. Supp. at 853 ("When
the defendant should clearly ascertain from the circumstances and the original complaint
that the case is removable, the defendant must remove, if at all, within 30 days of receipt
of that complaint."); cf Sanborn Plastics Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 753
F. Supp. 660, 663 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (adopting reasonably qualified attorney
standard-i.e., removal required within the initial thirty-day period if any reasonably
qualified attorney would or should know from the pleadings that the potential amount
exceeds $50,000).
176. Marler,793 F. Supp. at 659.
177. Alabama's rule on interrogatories is illustrative of the majority of the states.

It provides that "[tihe party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve
a copy of the answers, and the objections if any, within thirty (30) days after the service

of the interrogatories, except that the defendant may serve answers or objections within
forty-five (45) days after service of the summons and complaint upon that defendant.
The court may allow a shorter or longer time." ALA. R. Civ. P. 33(a). A handful of
states allow an even greater period of time. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 33(a) (requiring
answers to interrogatories to be served within 40 days); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (40 days);
MAss. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (45 days); R.I. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (40 days).
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Even if a court were to find that the case first becomes removable when the
plaintiffs answers to pre-removal interrogatories specify a dollar figure in excess
of $75,000, the defendant still must meet the one-year deadline in section
1446(b).' 78 This requirement can put the defendant's right to remove at the
mercy of a dilatory or unscrupulous plaintiff. In PerhatsAssociates, Inc. v.
Fasco Industries,'79 for example, defendant's counsel had served a request for
admissions on the plaintiffs "but each plaintiff responded.., after the one-year
bar date was already past-by hedging."' 80 The defendant, therefore, lost the
opportunity to remove even though the delay was caused by the plaintiffs.,
A
defendant would suffer the same fate if the plaintiff deliberately failed to respond
to interrogatory requests until after the one-year period expired,'82 or if the
plaintiff initially answered the interrogatory by indicating that the lawsuit sought
an amount less than $75,000 but later amended or supplemented the answer after
the one-year deadline to indicate a higher amount.
Because of these pitfalls in the removal process, one district court has
suggested that a defendant exercise an abundance of caution by filing a prompt
notice of removal upon receipt of an indeterminate complaint.' In the worst-

178. See supratext accompanying note 168. Congress enacted the one-year limit
on removal in 1988, at the same time that it increased the amount in controversy
requirement from $10,000 to $50,000. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(b) (2), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988). Congress
acknowledged that the one-year limit was a "modest curtailment" in a defendant's
removal rights, but concluded that the cut-off was necessary to "[reduce] the opportunity
for removal after substantial progress has been made in state court." H.R. REP. No. 889,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 72 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032 (1988).
More specifically, the House report suggests that the one-year limit was an attempt to
address the problems that arise when a diversity-destroying defendant is dismissed late
in the state court proceedings, thereby creating the opportunity for removal to federal
court. The report stated that removal that late in the proceedings "may result in
substantial delay and disruption." Id.
179. 843 F. Supp. 424,427 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
180.- Id. at 427 n.5
181. Id.
at 427.
182. See Vail v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 91-C-3053, 1991 WL 134275, at
*2 (N.D. I11.
July 12, 1991) (stating that the court "is troubled by the evasion exhibited
by the plaintiffs attorney, who has repeatedly refused to estimate the damages his client
has suffered and will suffer in the future").
183. McGraw v. Lyons, 863 F. Supp. 430, 433 n.8 (W.D. Ky 1994); see also
Charles A. Carlson, Removal to FederalCourton the Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction:The
"Amount in Controversy" Controversy,FLA. B.J., October 1995, at 77, 80 (encouraging

defendants to "proceed under the safest course of action," which is to remove promptly
"if the defendant in good faith believes that the complaint suggest that the amount in
controversy exceeds [the federal minimum]").
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case scenario, the action would be remanded but the defendant still would have
a second window of opportunity to remove if the plaintiff later made the
damages clear.' 84 The court acknowledged that this strategy arguably might
create a conflict with the defendant's responsibilities under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits attorneys from filing any
pleadings or other documents without a good faith belief that they are warranted
The court suggested, however, that
under the law and the facts of the case.'
defendants who harbor any doubts about whether they have the evidentiary
support to establish jurisdiction upon removal can protect themselves either by
(1) propounding interrogatories to the plaintiff at the same time that the petition
for removal is filed, or (2) if a remand motion is filed, asking the federal court

184. McCraw, 863 F. Supp. at 433 n.8. This second bite at the apple is still subject
to § 1446(b)'s one-year limit on removals, however. In an analogous situation, the
federal district court declined to speculate whether the defendant would be able to
remove the case if, upon remand, the state court were to subsequently dismiss two
nondiverse defendants whose presence in the suit deprived the federal court of
jurisdiction. Beritiech v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 881 F. Supp. 557, 562 (S.D. Ala.
1995).
The court appreciates that some of the year which Metropolitan Life has to
remove this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) has passed while this court
ruled on the motions to remand, but that appears to be the risk defendants
incur in removing diversity-based actions and then attempting in federal pourt
to get rid of nondiverse defendants, rather than moving to dismiss such
defendants in state court and removing the actions if the state court dismisses
the nondiverse defendants.
Id. at 562 n.6.
185. Rule 11 provides that "[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record ... .'By presenting the document to the
court:
an attorney . . . is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b).
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to delay its decision until limited discovery can be completed. 8 6 "Defense
counsel who make a good-faith attempt to show that the plaintiffs claims meet
87
the federal jurisdictional threshold will rarely subject themselves to sanctions."1
A number of defendants have opted for the early-removal approach, filing
their notice of removal within thirty days after being served with the plaintiffs
complaint and stating "a good faith belief' that the complaint seeks in excess of
the federal minimum. The dilemma then shifts to the federal courts to reconcile
the state-pleaded complaint with the federal jurisdictional requirements. Their
response has been varied, as illustrated in the following Section.

B. ProceduralMechanismsfor Reviewing
the Amount in Controversy
Although a handful of early decisions suggested that the plaintiffs failure
to specify damages in a state-pleaded complaint precludes the defendant from
removing the case to federal court (or, at the very least, would suggest that
removal is premature until the plaintiff has filed some other paper or pleading
that reveals a sufficient amount in controversy),'88 the vast majority of courts

186. McCraw, 863 F. Supp. at 435.
187. Id
188. See, e.g., Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co., 287 F.2d 252,
254-55 (5th Cir. 1961); Bonnell v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 202 F. Supp. 53, 54
(N.D. Fla. 1962); cf Rollwitz v. Burlington N. R.R., 507 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mont. 1981).
But see Robinson v. Quality Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 572, 575-76 (S.D. Ala. 1986)
(criticizing the Gaitor-Bonnell-Rollwitzanalysis). This view, which requires the court
to summarily remand the action back to state court, stems primarily from St. Paul

Mercury's statement that "the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is
apparently made in good faith." St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
at 283, 288 (1938). Thus, as one court stated in dictum, "[t]he jurisdictional amount is
that amount which is claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint and not that which is
alleged in the defendants petition for removal." Bonnell, 202 F. Supp. at 54 (citing
Gaitor, 287 F.2d at 255).
This is not to say that a defendant seeking to remove in a proper diversity case
is to be denied access to federal court merely because the complaint against

him is couched in nebulous mathematical phraseology, but, in such case, as
here, the key to the door is an affirmative showing by he who seeks entry of

all the requisite factors of diversity jurisdiction, including amount in
controversy, at the time removal is attempted. The complaint, as here, may

not be sufficient itself to make such showing, but removal may still be had
"within twenty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper,

from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is, or has
become removable."
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have extended the jurisdictional inquiry beyond the face of the plaintiffs
complaint.'89 Injustifying a broader scope of review, these courts have voiced
a concern for fairness-i.e., that limiting the jurisdictional review to the damages
pled in the plaintiffs complaint "would permit a plaintiff to defeat the
defendanfs right to a federal forum simply by omitting a specific ad damnum.
.t.."Io Moreover, one court has suggested that federal courts "have not only the
authority, but the duty to independently determine the propriety of
jurisdiction."''
Several different procedural mechanisms have been used to review
jurisdiction following removal of cases involving indeterminate or lowball
complaints, with varying degrees of success. The following Subsections
examine the four main viewpoints.
1. Taking Defendant's Jurisdictional Allegations at Face Value
When the amount in controversy is not expressly set forth in the plaintiffs
state-pleaded complaint (or the complaint states an amount less than the federal
jurisdictional threshold but the defendant believes that the plaintiff may be
entitled to a greater sum), the defendant must fill in the gap by including such

Gailor, 287 F.2d at 255 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)).
189. See, e.g., Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427-

28 (7th Cir. 1997) (where plaintiffs complaint states only that the amount in controversy
is "in excess of $15,000," the district court "may look outside the pleadings to other
evidence ofjurisdictional amount in the record").
190. Boiling v. Union Nafl Life Ins. Co., 900 F. Supp. 400, 405 (M.D. Ala. 1995);
see also Steele v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., 649 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (M.D. Ala. 1986)
("The Plaintiff should not be allowed to rob [the defendant] of its right to remove by
demanding such damages as may be 'fairly ascertained by the jury'. Permitting such
practice allows the Plaintiff to 'have his cake and eat it too' [because] the Plaintiff
effectively prevents federal jurisdiction by failing to demand a specific monetary figure,
while making it possible for the jury to return a verdict well in excess" of the federal
jurisdictional amount.).
191. Robinson v. Quality Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 572, 575 (S.D. Ala. 1986); cf
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (federal courts "have no more

right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not"); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1720-21 (1996) (noting that
federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them
by Congress but that the duty is not absolute; "federal courts may decline to exercise their
jurisdiction, in otherwise 'exceptional circumstances,' where denying a federal forum
would clearly serve an important countervailing interest, . .. for example where
abstention is warranted by considerations of'proper constitutional adjudication,' 'regard
for federal-state relations,' or 'wise judicial administration'") (quoting Colorado River

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
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allegations in the notice of removal."9 The courts disagree, however, as to how
detailed those allegations must be. 93
In conducting ajurisdictional inquiry, some courts simply have taken the
allegations in the defendanVs notice of removal at face value. 4 This inquiry has
been found inadequate, however, for several reasons. First, some opinions have
suggested that courts cannot give great weight to the defendant's bald statement
of the amount in controversy because many defendants are ill-situated to assess
damages at the time the notice of removal is filed' 9S-unless "crucial facts
supporting jurisdiction are known to the defendant," such as in suits for
injunctive or declaratory relief 96
Secondly, because the amount in controversy is a jurisdictional issue, it
cannot be waived by the plaintiff but, rather, is subject to challenge at any point
in the lawsuit (including an appeal). 97 Therefore, even if the plaintiff has not

192. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994) (requiring notice of removal to include a "short
and plain statement of the grounds for removal"); see Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d
871, 873 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 174 (1995) ("Both the requisite amount in
controversy and the existence of diversity must be affirmatively established on the face
of either the [complaint] or the removal notice.").
193. Prior to 1988, § 1446(a) had required the removal notice to include a "short

and plain statement of the facts" upon which jurisdiction rested if those facts were not
present in the pleadings. The 1988 amendments to the statute, however, changed the
requirement to a "short and plain statement of the grounds for removal ....
" Several
courts have recognized, therefore, that the current version requires the equivalent of
notice pleading-i.e., that the defendant can simply provide a blanket allegation that more
than $75,000 is in controversy. See, e.g., Cole v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 728 F. Supp.
1305, 1308 n.1 (E.D. Ky. 1990) ("By requiring a 'short and plain statement of the

grounds for removal' rather than the 'facts' justifying removal, Congress sought to
eliminate the possibility that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) might require fact pleading in petitions
for removal."); accordSimpson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 489, 491 (M.D.
Ga. 1994).
Notwithstanding the 1988 amendment, however, several courts have held that the
defendant must provide more than a conclusory allegation that the jurisdictional
requirement has been met. Thus, they have required the notice of removal to
affirmatively allege the underlyingfacts that support the jurisdictional claim. See, e.g.,
Laughlin, 50 F.3d at 873 ("The burden is on the party requesting removal to set forth, in

the notice of removal itself, the 'underlying facts supporting [the] assertion that the
amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].''); Herber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 886 F. Supp.
19,20 (D. Wyo. 1995) (remanding case because defendant's notice of removal failed to
allege underlying facts to support jurisdiction).
194. See, e.g., ANPAC v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 565 n.8

(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,510 U.S. 1041 (1994) (collecting cases).
195. Printworks, Inc. v. Dom Co., 869 F. Supp. 436, 441 (E.D. La. 1994).
196. ANPAC, 988 F.2d at 566.
197. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16-18 (1951) (allowing
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challenged the defendant's jurisdictional allegations in the notice of removal, a

jurisdictional issue to be raised for the first time in appeal before the Supreme Court); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (requiring a motion to remand to be filed within thirty days if
the motion attacks a defect in the removal process, but providing for a remand at any time
before final judgment is entered if it appears that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction).
The Seventh Circuits decision in Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.
1993), has been criticized as allowing a waiver in violation of this principle. In that case,
the plaintiffs state-filed complaint did not specify damages other than to state that they
were "in excess of $15,000." Id. at 366. The defendant's removal petition, however,
stated a good faith belief that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000. Id. The
plaintiff did not object to this allegation either in the district court or in its initial
pleadings on appeal; to the contrary, the jurisdictional statement in plaintiffs opening
brief to the Seventh Circuit alleged that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000.
Id It was only after the court itself began questioning the parties during oral argument
that the plaintiffs counsel "took up the jurisdictional issue with a vengeance," claiming
that his clients damages were less than $50,000. Id.
The court ultimately held that the jurisdictional amount was satisfied because the
plaintiff "has already conceded that his claim is worth more than $50,000: by not
contesting removal when the motion was originally made, and by jurisdictional
statements to this Court in his first brief." Id at 367-68. Although counsel subsequently
argued that the claim was worth less than $50,000, that lawyer had "also signed the brief
that assured us jurisdiction was intact; it is indeed a wonder that he shouldn't be subject
to sanctions for swearing one thing in one brief and then swearing the opposite thing in
a subsequent affidavit after it became clear that telling a new story might benefit his
client." Id. at 368.
The Tenth Circuit criticized the Shaw decision, stating that "[w]e do not agree..
thatjurisdiction can be 'conceded."' Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 874 (10th
Cir. 1995); cf United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. Centermark
Properties Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing its case from
Shaw on factual grounds and, therefore, declining to speculate whether it would follow.
Sha's "waiver approach"). However, the Shaw decision was not based upon a waiver
of jurisdiction; rather, the Seventh Circuit concluded that plaintiffs counsel had
conceded the existence of a particular fact that was a prerequisite to exercising
jurisdiction.
As the Seventh Circuit explained, this is much like the plaintiff who alleges a
specific sum in the complaint but attempts to amend the complaint after removal to seek
a lower amount:
If we were to permit Shaw to get away with this, we would be allowing him
to manipulate defendants in the very manner that is prohibited by the rule in
St. Paul: once removal is perfected, the plaintiff cannot suddenly decide that,
after all, the amount in controversy is less than the jurisdictional amount so
that the case must go shuttling back to state court.
Shaiv, 994 F.2d at 368; cf Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Shaiv for the proposition that "a party's change of mind about whether a
prerequisite to jurisdiction is present is not conclusive").
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court still may insist that the defendant justify those allegations.' 98 Indeed, a
number of courts now conduct routine jurisdictional checks on newly filed cases
to ensure that any jurisdictional problems are addressed before considerable time
and resources are invested in the cases.'
2. Stipulations Regarding the Amount in Controversy
Some courts tried to put the ball back in the plaintiffs court to defeat
jurisdiction after removal. Thus, if the plaintiff filed a motion to remand alleging
that the amount in controversy was less than the federal minimum, these courts
would grant the motion only if the plaintiff filed a stipulation or affidavit to that
effect.2' The plaintiff then would be bound by the stipulation upon remand and
precluded from recovering in excess of that amount in the subsequent state court
proceedings.20 '
This procedure is appealing because it allows the plaintiff to be master of
the complaint-i.e., to exercise his or her right to avoid federal court by
deliberately seeking an amount less than the federal jurisdictional minimum. It
also makes sense to require the plaintiff, as the party seeking recovery, to reveal
the extent of his or her damages. There is considerable controversy, however,
as to whether this procedure is appropriate.
The Seventh Circuit has rejected the use of post-removal stipulations, 202
concluding that they are inconsistent with the holding of St. PaulMereury.2 3 As
the court pointed out, St. PaulMercury held that jurisdiction depends upon the
situation at the time of removal. 2 4 Therefore, once a case is properly removed,

198. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992).
199. See Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir.
1994) ("[W]ith mounting federal case loads ....
it has become doubly important that the
district courts take measures to discover those suits which [do not belong in a federal
court] and to dismiss them when the court is convinced to a legal certainty that the
plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of [the minimum statutory jurisdictional
amount].") (quoting Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1966));
Maki v. Keller Indus., 761 F. Supp. 66, 67 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (citing Wisconsin Knife
Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986), for the
proposition that "[t]he first thing a federal judge should do when a complaint is filed is
check to see that federal jurisdiction is properly alleged").
200. See, e.g., Dennler v. Shell Oil Co., No. 91-916-WLB (S.D. I11.July 21, 1992),
attached as appendix to In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992).
201. Id.
202. Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424,429(7th Cir.
1997); In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 356.
203. 303 U.S. 283, 292 (1938).

204. In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 356.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1

58

Noble-Allgire: Noble-Allgire: Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determined
REMOVAL OF DIVERSITYACTIONS
1997]

the plaintiff cannot obtain a remand by amending the complaint, nor can the
plaintiff accomplish the same result by filing a post-removal affidavit or
stipulation indicating that the damages are less than the federal jurisdictional
amount.20 As the court explained in a later decision: "It seems unfair to
defendants if a plaintiff can simply wait to see if her case is removed and then,
once it is, have it sent back to state court by agreeing to a stipulation
that the
2
amount in controversy will not surpass [the federal minimum]." 1
The Seventh Circuit recognized a potential problem for plaintiffs who
wished to avoid federal court but were prohibited by the state's pleading rules
from pleading a specific sum in damages in the complaint. Nevertheless, the
court held that a post-removal affidavit or stipulation was not the proper way for
the plaintiff to avoid removal. Instead, the court stated, "[Il]itigants who want to
prevent removal must file a binding stipulation or affidavit with their complaints;
once a defendant has removed the case, St. PaulMercury makes later filings
irrelevant. 2 °7
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that post-removal stipulations
may be considered in some cases.208 The court recognized that under St. Paul

205. Id

206. Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364,367 (7th Cir. 1993).
207. Chase, 110 F.3d at 430 (emphasis added); In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at
356. The key requirement, however, is that the affidavit or stipulation must be binding.
Otherwise, the plaintiff would be in the same position as a plaintiff who has pled a
specific sum lower than $75,000 but, under state pleading rules, is not limited to the
amount set forth in the pleadings. As discussed earlier, several courts have held that such
a case may be subject to removal notwithstanding the plaintiffs demand. See supra text
accompanying notes 39-40.
In De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1413 (5th Cir.), cert.denied, 116 S. Ct.

180 (1995), an attorney for the plaintiffs had attached to the complaint an affidavit that
purported to limit the amount of damages the plaintiffs sought to recover. "The federal
district court reasoned, however, that the plaintiffs [who were relatives of persons who
had died in an airplane crash] could not effectively limit the amount of damages they
could obtain unless they had the authority to bind the estates by limiting damages. In
order to do so, they had to be the legal representatives or legal heirs of the estates." Id.
The appellate court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs' attorney did not represent
all of the heirs and, therefore, the affidavit was not binding. Id. at 1415. The court,
therefore, held that the plaintiffs had failed to defeat removal jurisdiction. Id.
208. ANPAC v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 565 n.8 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994); see also Manuel v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 779
F. Supp. 56, 57-58 (W.D. La 1991) (accepting post-removal stipulation from plaintiff);
Cole v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 728 F. Supp. 1305, 1308-09 (E.D. Ky. 1990)
(accepting a'post-removal affidavit by plaintiff); Robinson v. Quality Ins. Co., 633 F.
Supp. 572, 577 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (granting remand based on plaintiffs post-removal
insertion of an ad damnum clause into a previously indeterminate complaint); cf
Printworks, Inc. v. Dom Co., 869 F. Supp. 436, 439, 441 (E.D. La. 1994) (accepting
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Mercury, a plaintiff may not defeat removal by changing a demand request after
the notice of removal has been filed. The court held, however, that in cases
where the state-filed complaint fails to identify the sum in controversy, the
plaintiffs post-removal affidavit does not alter the amount of damages. Instead,
it merely clarifies or identifies the amount for the first time.2" "[T]he court is
still examining the jurisdictional facts as ofthe time the case is removed, but the
court is considering information submitted after removal" to make that
determination.1 0
On a related issue, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court may accept a
plaintiffs judicial admission that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal
minimum."' In concluding that such an admission would not be the equivalent
of waiving or stipulating to jurisdiction,1 2 the court explained:
Where the plaintiff filed the case in state court, and did not seek the federal
forum, then the plaintiffs formal judicial admission that the amount in
controversy exceeds [$75,000] has the effect of defeating the plaintiffs choice
of forum. In this context, where state law prohibited the plaintiff from stating
the amount in controversy in the complaint, the district judge has discretion

attorney's statement as to pre-removal discussions that showed jurisdiction not present
at time of removal); Oder v. Buckeye State Mut. Ins., 817 F. Supp. 1413, 1413-14 (S.D.

Ind. 1992) (remanding case based upon "certification" in plaintiffs' motion opposing
removal that plaintiffs do not seek recovery in excess of federal jurisdictional amount);
Hall v. Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (remand based upon
post-removal affidavit in which plaintiff agreed to seek no more than a certain amount
in attorney fees, thereby remaining below the federal jurisdictional threshold).
209. ANPAC, 988 F.2d at 565.
210. Id.; see also Reason v. General Motors Corp., 896 F. Supp. 829, 833 (S.D.
Ind. 1995) (accepting plaintiffs' post-remand affidavit "as their first assertion of the
amount in controversy"); Cole, 728 F. Supp. at 1309 (stating that plaintiffs post-removal
stipulation "did not have the effect of changing the information on which [the defendant]
relied [in removing the case], but instead providing the information for the first time");
Oder, 817 F. Supp. at 1414 ("[W]hen defendant sought removal [of plaintiffs
indeterminate complaint], it was defendant's contention that the amount in controversy
exceeded $50,000. Plaintiffs have, with their supplemental pleading, made their first
assertions in this regard; they have not amended any prior contention.").
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged ANPAC's exception but declined to apply it in
Chase, noting that "the exception created in ANPAC was based on a record void of any
assertion by plaintiff ofthe value of his claim." 110 F.3d at 429-30. The Seventh Circuit
said there was no such void in Chase because the plaintiff had previously attempted to
settle her case for an amount that exceeded the jurisdictional threshold. Id at 430. The
plaintiff also had refused the defendanVs request to admit that the plaintiff would not seek
more than $50,000 in damages. Id.
211. Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997).
212. Id.
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to accept the admission as establishing it. Otherwise we would be adopting
the illogical position that a plaintiff can establish the amount in controversy
by an ad damnum, but not by formal admission against the plaintiffs interest
in choice of forum."'
In jurisdictions that allow post-removal stipulations or affidavits filed by the
plaintiff, the document must be binding in nature.214 If such documents "fall
short of stipulating that the claimant will not seek more than the jurisdictional
amount, jurisdiction must be assessed with reference to all the evidence."21 One
federal district court has cautioned plaintiffs that if they should "hereafter
disregard their stipulation and seek damages over [$75,000.00]" in the state court
proceedings, then "upon application to this court, sanctions will be swift in
'
coming and painful upon arrival."216

3. Independent Appraisals by the Court
Another method of handling the jurisdictional inquiry is for the court to
make its own independent evaluation of the amount in controversy. In doing so,
the court first will consider whether it is "facially apparent" that the plaintiffs
claim exceeds the federal jurisdictional threshold. The court will "look only at
the face of the complaint and ask whether the amount in controversy was likely
to exceed [$75,000]" because of the nature of the plaintiffs claim for damages.217

213. Id.
214. See Printworks, Inc. v. Dom Co., 869 F. Supp. 436, 440 (E.D. La. 1994).
215. Id.; see also Relfv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 91-1514, 1992 WL 245629,
at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 15, 1992) (holding that despite plaintiffs claim that damages were
less than $50,000, remand was not proper in light of plaintiffs settlement demands
indicating a higher valuation of the case and plaintiffs failure to stipulate that he would
limit his claim to an amount less than $50,000), rev'd, 49 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished opinion); Hall v. Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Ga.
1988) (indicating unwillingness to remand unless plaintiff filed a binding stipulation that
he would seek only a certain amount in attorney fees, thereby remaining below the
federal jurisdictional threshold).
216. Freeman v. Transouth Fin. Corp., Civ. A. No. 94-D-731-N, 1995 WL 376933,
at *1 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 3, 1994); Teal v. Associates Fin. Life Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 94-D732-N, 1995 WL 376930, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 1994).
217. Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995). In De
Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1993), for example, the court found it
"facially apparent" that the plaintiffs' claims-which included "wrongful death, terror in
anticipation of death, loss of companionship, and funeral expenses" resulting from the
deaths of plaintiffs' decedents in an airline crash-exceeded $50,000. However, in
ANPAC v. Dow Quimicade Colombia,S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 565 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994), the court concluded that the injuries alleged by the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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In cases where the "facially apparent" test is not met, the court will proceed to
the second part of the inquiry, requiring the parties "to submit summaryjudgment-type evidence, relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of
removal.

21 8

To make these determinations, several related issues must be addressed.
First, the court must determine what types of damages the plaintiff may recover
under the applicable state's laws.219 For example, the court may need to decide
whether the plaintiff is legally entitled to punitive damages and/or attorney fees

plaintiff fishermen-skin rashes and the loss of fishing income attributed to a chemical
spill-"are not ones that are facially likely to be over the jurisdictional amount."
218. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1336; see also Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116
F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that if it is not facially apparent from the complaint
that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy, "the court may consider facts in the
removal petition, and may 'require the parties to submit summary-judgment-type
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal'"); United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. Centermark Properties Meriden Square, Inc.,
30 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Where the pleadings themselves are inconclusive as
to the amount in controversy.... federal courts may look outside those pleadings to other

evidence in the record.").
The "summary judgment-type evidence" that may be considered includes
"interrogatories, requests for admissions, or other written documents the defendant may

be able to establish the veracity of the material allegations in [the] petition for removal."
Wright v. Continental Cas. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (M.D. Fla. 1978); see also
Larkin v. Brown, 41 F.3d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1994) ("In determining the amount in
controversy pursuant to a motion to dismiss, answers to interrogatories serve as the
equivalent of affidavits to either support or defeat diversity jurisdiction.").
The key inquiry, of course, is to determine the amount in controversy at the time

that the removal notice was filed. However, in making that inquiry, post-removal
interrogatories and other forms of discovery may be used "if they are probative of the
amount in controversy at the time ofremoval." Harmon v. OKI Sys., 902 F. Supp. 176,
178 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (emphasis added) (concluding that plaintiffs answers to postremoval interrogatories were relevant because they showed that by the time of removal,
the plaintiff had already incurred medical expenses in excess of $55,000 as well as lost
wages in excess of $80,000), affd, 115 F.3d 477,480 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The test should
simply be whether the evidence sheds light on the situation which existed when the case
was removed.").
219. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1961)
("[D]etermination of the value of the matter in controversy for purposes of federal
jurisdiction is a federal question" but "federal courts must, of course, look to state law to
determine the nature and extent of the right to be enforced in a diversity case."); Gilmer
v. Walt Disney Co., 915 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (W.D. Ark. 1996) ("In making the
determination in a diversity case, the court looks to state law to determine the nature and

extent of the right to be enforced as well as the state measure of damages and the
availability of special and punitive damages.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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in addition to compensatory damages." Secondly, once the applicable types of
damages are identified, the court must attempt to assess the amount at stake in
each category. Some sub-issues that arise in this inquiry include questions as to
whether a plaintiffs multiple claims or the damages of multiple plaintiffs should
be aggregated"2 and whether the amount in controversy should be measured
from the plaintiffs perspective or the defendant's perspective. 2
The court's independent appraisal of the amount in controversy is relatively
straighiforward in many cases, such as where the plaintiff earns more than
$40,000 per year and alleges an injury that has resulted in more than two years
of lost wages. Simple mathematics shows that the jurisdictional amount is
satisfied in that case.
Other cases are more problematic, such as when a plaintiff has incurred
medical bills of only $30,000, but is seeking additional damages for pain and
suffering, an item of damages that is not readily quantifiable but, rather, left to
the discretion of the fact finder.'
Some courts have allowed defendants to
establish the jurisdictional amount in these types of cases by citing jury verdicts
in similar cases that exceeded the federal jurisdictional threshold.' Other courts
have been reluctant to rely on such verdicts, however, particularly if the verdict

220. See, e.g., Melkus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 503 F. Supp. 842, 846 (E.D. Mich.
1980) (considering whether state law allows exemplary damages in a common law action
for a commercial contract). Similarly, the amount in controversy may hinge upon
whether the plaintiff can legally recover emotional distress damages in addition to pure
economic relief.
221. See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir.
1996) (considering whether punitive damages may be aggregated in class action); Allen
v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1332-35 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Reason v. General
Motors Corp., 896 F. Supp. 829, 834 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (discussing general rules of
aggregation and applying to a spouse's loss of consortium claim).
222. This issue frequently arises in suits for injunctive or declaratory relief. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JuIusDICTION 292 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing three lines
of cases: (1) cases adopting the "plaintiffs viewpoint," which looks only to the value of
the case from plaintiffs view and ignores the defendant; (2) cases adopting the viewpoint
of the party seeking jurisdiction; and (3) cases adopting the "either viewpoint" rule in
which the court looks to the cost or benefit of either party).
223. See, e.g., Goldstein v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 887 F. Supp. 168, 173 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
224. See, e.g., Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476,
1481 (D. Or. 1994) (in finding that suit brought by skater Tonya Harding was for more
than $50,000, court considered awards from other cases, including ajury verdict of $27
million in a dispute with another athlete who sued over his eligibility for the Olympic
games); Kennard v. Harris Corp., 728 F. Supp. 453, 454 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (taking
judicial notice ofjury verdicts of more than $50,000 in nineteen other products liability
suits within the same county).
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was entered in another geographic area or if the injuries were not substantially
similar to those in the case at bar.' As one court explained: "The verdicts from
other cases provide no guidance
without factual information that would permit
'' 6
a meaningful comparison.

11

Equally problematic are the awkward roles in which the parties are cast
when arguing the issue. As the Seventh Circuit observed in one such case, "[A]t
oral argument we had the privilege of witnessing a comic scene: plaintiffs
personal injury lawyer protests up and down that his client's injuries are as minor
and insignificant as can be, while attorneys for the manufacturer paint a sob story
about how plaintiffs life has been wrecked." 27
4. Pre-removal Discovery and Settlement Offers
To avoid the problems inherent in a post-removal appraisal of the amount
in controversy, several courts have suggested that the defendant should attempt
to determine the exact amount of damages before attempting to remove the case
to federal court. 8 These courts point out that while state pleading rules may
prohibit the plaintiff from specifying damages in the complaint, those same rules
often provide other avenues by which a defendant can determine the amount in
controversy, such as serving interrogatories, 229 requests to admit,"0 or other

225. Goldstein, 887 F. Supp. at 173 (rejecting evidence of verdicts in other cases
where defendant made no effort to compare the injuries in those cases to the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff); see also Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 147 (5th Cir.
1990) (refusing to considerjudgments in other cases alleging tooth discoloration caused
by tetracycline; court observes a wide variation in damage awards in those cases and that
defendant failed to provide evidence comparing the degree of discoloration that plaintiff
experienced with that present in the prior cases); Coleman v. Southern Norfolk, 734 F.
Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. La. 1990) ("Damage claims raised in other cases do not amount to
the type of 'affirmative showing' of the Court's jurisdiction that is required of parties
seeking removal.").
226. Reason v. General Motors Corp., 896 F. Supp. 829, 835 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
227. Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993).
228. Id.
at 367; see also ANPAC v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, S.A., 988 F.2d
559, 565 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) ("If defendants wish to avoid the procedure of removing a
case and then having it remanded after the plaintiff comes forward with an affidavit
specifying his damages, there are other avenues available for clarifying an indeterminate
complaint."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994). However, while the Seventh Circuit
has suggested that pre-removal discovery is "eminently sensible," the court stopped short
of declaring that this is the only means by which a defendant can establish jurisdiction.
Shaw, 994 F.2d at 367.
229. Shaw, 994 F.2d at 367, 374 (although Illinois prohibits plaintiffs from
alleging specific damages in a personal injury action, the statute goes on to provide that
"[n]othing in this Section shall be construed as prohibiting the defendant from requesting
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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similar requests upon the plaintiff.' A plaintiffs pre-removal settlement offer
or monetary demand may provide the same information. 2
One federal judge has suggested a bright-line rule that would prohibit a
defendant from removing an indeterminate complaint from state court unless the
defendant shows either (1) that the plaintiff has made a dollar demand in an
amount that exceeds the federal jurisdictional minimum or (2) that the plaintiffs

of the plaintiff by interrogatory the amount of damages which will be sought") (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-604, recodifiedin 1993 as 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-604);
ANPAC, 988 F.2d at 565 n.7 (noting that Texas law expressly provides that upon special
exception by the defendant, the plaintiff may be required to amend his complaint to
specify the maximum amount claimed) (citing TEX.R. Civ. P. 47); Coleman v. Southern
Norfolk, 734 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. La. 1990) (refusing to speculate as to amount in
controversy when state procedural rules provided a mechanism for the defendant to
ascertain the actual amount of damages prior to removal) (citing LA. CODE CIv. P. ANN.
art. 893(A) (1) (West Supp. 1997), which provides: "By interrogatory, an opposing party
may seek specification of the amount sought as damages, and the response may thereafter
be supplemented as appropriate."); see also IOWA R. CIv. P. 69(a) (generally prohibiting
a pleading from stating a specific amount of damages but providing that "[t]he specific
amount and elements of monetary damages sought may be discovered by the use of
interrogatories"); KY. R. Civ. P. 8.01(2) (generally prohibiting allegation of specific sum
as alleged damages in an action for unliquidated damages but providing that "[w]hen a
claim is made against a party for unliquidated damages, that party may obtain
information as to the amount claimed by interrogatories; if this is done, the amount
claimed shall not exceed the last amount stated in answer to interrogatories").
230. John B. White, Note, FederalRemoval-JurisdictionalAmount,15 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 415, 418-19 (1961).
231. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3017 (McKinney 1996) (generally prohibiting
plaintiff from stating specific amount of damages in medical or dental malpractice suit
or claim against a municipal corporation but providing that the defendant "may at any
time request a supplemental demand setting forth the total damages to which the pleader
deems himself entitled"); N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2) ("[A]t any time after service of the
claim for relief, any party may request of the claimant a written statement of the monetary
relief sought .... "); OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2) ("At any time after the pleading is filed and
served, any party from whom monetary recovery is sought may request in writing that
the party seeking recovery provide the requesting party a written statement of the amount
of recovery sought. Upon motion, the court shall require the party to respond to the
request.").
232. See, e.g., Shaw, 994 F.2d at 376 n.6 (Shadur, J., dissenting) (if plaintiffs
demand "is for more than [$75,000] and defendant has no good faith basis for viewing
the demand as wholly unrealistic, by definition the right to remove exists at the outset of
the litigation"); but see Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 429
(7th Cir. 1997) (court declined to determine whether defendant's settlement offer is
relevant to show that the amount in controversy was less than $75,000; the court states
that even if the $4,400 offer were relevant, it did not reflect all of the damages that
plaintiff was requesting in her lawsuit).
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response to a pre-removal interrogatory demonstrates that the requisite amount
is in controversy. 3 The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected such a rigid
approach. Although the court suggested that the use of pre-removal discovery
is "eminently sensible" when the plaintiffs complaint is ambiguous as to the
amount in controversy, the court stopped short of declaring that such procedures
provided the only way in which jurisdiction could be established. 4
While pre-removal discovery is commendable in some cases, defendants
face some potential timing problems. As pointed out above, if the defendant
waits for answers to such interrogatories, the plaintiff could claim that the notice
of removal was untimely because section 1446(b) generally requires the notice
of removal to be filed within thirty days after service of the initial complaint and
summons." The defendants counter argument, of course, is that removal of an
indeterminate complaint would fall under the second part of section 1446(b),
allowing removal within thirty days after the defendant receives an amended
pleading or other document "from which it may first be ascertained that the case
is one which is or has become removable... ." As discussed above, however,
the courts are divided as to which section is controlling. 6
The plaintiffs pre-removal settlement offer or demand has its own
drawbacks as a means of establishing the amount in controversy. While some
courts have suggested that such a demand provides good evidence of the value
of the case z 7 other courts expressed reluctance to rely on such a demand absent
some additional information to support a good faith basis for the amount?28 As
one court observed, "In our adversary system, federal jurisdiction should not turn
on telephone 'puffing' from counsel for the plaintiff, who may want to increase
his or her settlement potential or recovery, or counsel for defendant, who may
9
be receptive to the puffing for purposes of removal."u2
Similar problems exist when the pre-removal settlement offer comes from
the defendant. In one case, for example, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand,
arguing that the defendant had offered to settle the personal injury action for

233. Shaw, 994 F.2d at 378 (Shadur, J., dissenting).
234. Id.at 367.
235. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
236. See supranotes 172-77 and accompanying text.

237. See supra note 232; Vail v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 91-C-3053, 1991
WL 134275, at *3(N.D. Ill. July 12, 1991) (finding sufficient evidence ofjurisdictional
amount where affidavit indicated that plaintiffs counsel had stated that she was looking
for "a lot more" than the $15,000 mentioned in the prayer for relief and that settlement
discussions would be impossible unless a six-figure offer were made).
238. See, e.g., Navarro v. Subaru of Am. Operations Corp., 802 F. Supp. 191, 194
(N.D. Il. 1992).
239. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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$4,400.241 The court rejected the argument, holding that even if the offer could
be considered as evidence of the amount in controversy, the offer was for only
the plaintiffs actual medical expenses.241 Because the offer failed to account for
other damages plaintiff was requesting in her lawsuit-such as pain and
suffering, future medical treatment, and loss of past and future earnings-the
court concluded that the offer "does not accurately represent the amount [the
plaintiff] has put into controversy...

,,242

In sum, there is great confusion as to how to resolve the difficult
jurisdictional dilemmas presented by removal cases involving state-pleaded
complaints that do not expressly demand a specific sum of damages exceeding
the federal jurisdictional minimum. The courts have issued irreconcilable
decisions on almost every aspect of the process, from the basic standard to
determine whether the requisite amount in controversy exists, to the procedures
to be followed in making that inquiry. Part IV of this Article offers several
statutory proposals to bring coherence to this jurisdictional analysis.
IV. A STATUTORY REMEDY
By adopting the uniform standard of judicial review suggested in Part 1(C),
the Supreme Court can eliminate much of the confusion that exists among the
lower federal courts over the appropriate jurisdictional review for removal cases.
But the Court cannot take this action until it is presented with an appropriate case
and, until the Court acts, it is likely that the lower courts will remain splintered
in their approach to the issue. Moreover, adoption of a uniform standard does
not address the procedural problems that were identified in Part III.243
Congress,
therefore, should consider statutory amendments to ensure that its equal-access
removal policy will be more fully realized.

240.
1997).
241.
242.
243.

Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424,428-29 (7th Cir.
Id.at 429.
Id.
See supranotes 167-242 and accompanying text.
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This Part of the Article suggests a three-part approach: First, in the absence
of a Supreme Court decision, Congress should adopt the uniform standard of
jurisdictional review proposed in Part II(C). Second, Congress should clarify the
deadline for filing the removal petition. Third, Congress should allow plaintiffs
to obtain an automatic remand by filing a binding post-removal stipulation that
244
the amount in controversy is less than the federal minimum.

244. Of course, another obvious way of resolving these jurisdictional dilemmas is
to eliminate diversity jurisdiction altogether, as has been suggested from time to time.
One of the most recent suggestions came from the Federal Courts Study Committee in
1990. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 53, at 38-42. The
committee stopped short of recommending that diversity jurisdiction be abolished
entirely; to the contrary, it recognized that there are some disputes that require a federal
forum. Id. at 39-40. Accordingly, the committee recommended limiting diversity
jurisdiction to a few select types of cases, such as complex multistate litigation,
interpleader, and suits involving aliens. Id. at 38.
Congress so far has declined to take such drastic action, however. Rather than
eliminating diversity jurisdiction entirely, it has chosen instead to restrict the number of
diversity cases by increasing the amount in controversy requirement over the years.
Legislative efforts to eliminate or reduce diversity jurisdiction in the Federal
courts come to the fore at various intervals. The Judicial Conference of the
United States has long supported total abolition of diversity jurisdiction, as
well as measures short of total elimination, such as eliminating in-State
plaintiff suits and raising the jurisdictional amount. It has always been a
controversial endeavor. However, as inflation, the workload of the Federal
courts, and the unwillingness of Congress to solve caseload problems by
creating new judgeships coalesce pressures are created to review ways to
reduce Federal jurisdiction. This often takes the form, as it did in 1958, of
raising the jurisdictional amount in controversy. On the other hand, in the late
1970's through the leadership of Congressman Kastenmeier the House voted
to eliminate diversity jurisdiction-an effort that failed to achieve meaningful
diversity reform in conference by the closest of margins.
H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 6005. The issue resurfaced during 1988, with the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice voting to generally abolish diversity of
citizenship. The House Judiciary Committee ultimately resolved the debate that year,
however, by voting to increase the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction from
$10,000 to $50,000). Id.at 45, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6005.
With the recent increase from $50,000 to $75,000, the amount in controversy has
been raised six times since the original amount was set at $500 by the Judicial Act of
1789. Douglas D. McFarland, The UnconstitutionalStub of Section 1441(C), 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1059, 1059 n.1 (1993) (noting that the amount was increased in 1887 to $2000,
in 1911 to $3000, in 1958 to $10,000, and in 1988 to $50,000). "Other times, Congress
whittles an additional jurisdictional sliver from the diversity block. For example, since
1948 improper or collusive joinder to create diversity has been prohibited (28 U.S.C. §
1359 (1988)), since 1958 corporations have had dual citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
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A. Adoption of a Uniform StandardofJudicialReview
Congress can adopt a uniform standard ofjurisdictional review in diversity
cases by amending Title 28, section 1332(c) to add the following italicized
provisions: 45

(1) (1988)), and since 1988 the legal representative of the estate of a decedent has been
deemed to be from the same state.as the decedent (28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2) (1988))." Id.
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 currently provides, in its entirety:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien
admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a
citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a
statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally
in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the
sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or
counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and
exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the
plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.
(c) For the purposes ofthis section and section 1441 of this title(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which
it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business, except that in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or
contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall
be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as
of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principal place of business; and
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed
to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent, and the legal
representative of an infant or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only
of the same State as the infant or incompetent.
(d) The word "States", as used in this section, includes the Territories,
the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. 1997).
Paragraph (c) would have to be renumbered to allow the proposed revision to be
displayed prominently as subsection (c) (1).
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(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title(1) the party invoking the court's jurisdiction bears the burden of
demonstratingthat the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000. For cases in which the plaintiffs damages arefixed or readily
ascertainable under the substantive law, the party invoking the court's
jurisdictionmust show that a recovery in excess of $75,000 would not be
prohibitedundersuch lIv. In cases where the amount ofdamages is left to
thefactfinder's discretion, the party must show that a recovery in excess of
$75,000 would not be set aside as excessive under the applicablestate's law
for reviewing jury verdicts. The parties may support or oppose the
establishment of thisjurisdictionalfact with sworn affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatoriesand other competent evidence, includingjury
verdicts recoveredon substantiallysimilarclaims.246

This revision would codify the two-part jurisdictional test employed by the
early Supreme Court decisions,247 while clarifying what is required under the
reasonable expectation standard. It assumes, of course, that Congress will agree
that the reasonable expectation standard strikes the appropriate compromise
between the litigants' statutory right to have a case heard in federal court and the
congressional desire to limit diversity and removal jurisdiction to those cases in
which the amount in controversy is substantial. The last sentence of the revision
addresses the related procedural issue concerning the type of evidence that may
be considered by the courts in determining whether the requisite amount in
controversy exists.

B. Clarificationofthe Removal Deadline
To clarify the deadline for filing a removal notice, Congress should revise
section 1446(b) as follows (the revised material has been italicized):
(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the
service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been
filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever
period is shorter.
In a case removed on the basis ofjurisdictionconferredby section 1332
of this title, the defendant must file a notice of removal within the thirty-day
periodset forth above if the plaintiffs initialpleading requests a specific
amount of damages exceeding $75,000. If the pleadingdoes not contain a

246. The paragraphs that are currently numbered (c) (1) and (c) (2) would have to
be re-designated as (c) (2) and (c) (3), respectively.
247. See supranotes 70-79 and accompanying text.
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specific requestforreliefor ifit specifies an amount of $75, 000 or less, the
defendant may file a notice of removal within the thirty-dayperiod based
upon a good faith belief that the amount in controversy in fact exceeds
$75,000.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable or if the
removability ofthe case is uncertainbecause of an ambiguity in the amount
in controversy, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that
a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section
1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action.248

This revision would resolve the "Hobson's choice" that defendants now face
in trying to decide whether they should promptly file a notice of removal when
presented with an indeterminate or lowball complaint or wait until they
accumulate other evidence to demonstrate that the amount in controversy
requirement is satisfied. The proposal would give the defendant the option of
filing a notice of removal immediately upon receipt of the complaint if the
defendant has a good faith belief that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000
and can establish that fact after removal, or waiting until receipt of an amended
pleading or other paper that clarifies the amount in controversy.

248. Section 1446(b) currently provides:
(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the
service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been
filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever
period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or
other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which
is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the
basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year
after commencement of the action.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994).
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C. Authorization ofPost-removalStipulations
The final proposed revision would modify the post-removal procedures in
section 1447 to allow the plaintiff to clarify the amount in controversy after
removal (again, the revised material has been italicized):
(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal
procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of
removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.
In a case removed on the basis ofjurisdictionconferredby section 1332
ofthis title, a motion to remandshall be grantedautomaticallyif the plaintiff,
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal, files a binding
stipulationthat the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. [The
plaintiffmay not rescind or modify this stipulation after remand except for
good cause, which is to be determined by the districtcourtfrom which the
case was remanded. If the district court determines that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 afier allowing such modification or rescission,
the court may reinstate thefederalproceedings at the defendant's request.
Reinstatementunder this section is not subject to section 1446(b)'sprovisions
prohibitingremoval more than one year after commencement of the action.]
An order remanding the case may require payment ofjust costs and any
actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.
A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the
clerk of
the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such
9
case.A

249. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (Supp. 1996). In its entirety, this section currently provides:
(a) In any case removed from a State court, the district court may issue
all necessary orders and process to bring before it all proper parties whether
served by process issued by the State court or otherwise.
(b) It may require the removing party to file with its clerk copies of all
records and proceedings in such State court or may cause the same to be
brought before it by writ of certiorari issued to such State court.
(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than
lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing
of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment
ofjust costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a
result ofthe removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed
by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon
proceed with such case.
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/1
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This amendment would statutorily overrule the judicial decisions holding
that the plaintiff cannot avoid federal court by filing such a stipulation after the
notice of removal has been filed. In doing so, it resolves the jurisdictional
dilemma faced by a plaintiff who wants to avoid federal court by waiving any
recovery in excess of $75,000 but is prohibited by state pleading rules from
explicitly making this type of request in the complaint. At the same time, the
statutory amendment allows the defendant to remain in federal court when there
is a reasonable expectation that the defendant's exposure in the case exceeds the
federal minimum. The proposed revision to section 1332(c) would make it clear,
however, that the ultimate burden of proof remains on the defendant to show that
this reasonable expectation exists.
Because this bright-line rule may pose a hardship upon plaintiffs who
discover post-remand that their damages are greater than anticipated, Congress
should consider including the bracketed material, which would allow a plaintiff
to rescind the stipulation after remand, but only with the federal district court's
approval and only upon a showing of good cause. If a plaintiff is authorized to
rescind the stipulation, the federal court has the discretion to reinstate the federal
proceedings notwithstanding the expiration of the one-year limit imposed by
section 1447(b). In exercising this discretion, however, the federal court should
weigh the equities of removal at that time, paying particular attention to how far
the case has progressed in the state court.
By making these statutory changes, Congress can pull the curtain on many
of the "comic scenes" that are being played out in some removal cases-when the
plaintiffs attorney attempts to avoid federal jurisdiction by arguing that his
client's injuries are insignificant while the defendant's attorney attempts to
establish federal jurisdiction by arguing that the plaintiffs life has been
devastated.' 0 Presumably, most plaintiffs who desire to avoid federal court will
do so by waiving the right to recover in excess of the federal minimum. That
should reduce the controversy to a few cases in which the plaintiffs are unwilling
to give up whatever chance they might have of recovering more than $75,000.
In those cases, the courts simply must determine whether the plaintiffs chances
reach the level of a "reasonable expectation."

remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to
section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants
whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny
joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.
250. See supratext accompanying note 227.
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V. CONCLUSION

Great confusion exists among the federal courts regarding the appropriate
jurisdictional analysis to be used to determine the amount in controversy in cases
removed from state court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Although the
inquiry is straightforward in removal cases when the complaint requests a
specific amount of damages that exceeds the federal amount in controversy
requirement, complications arise when the complaint fails to request a specific
sum or requests an amount that is less than the federal minimum. Under the
current statutory framework, federal courts are sharply divided as to how to
resolve the jurisdictional dilemmas presented by these latter removal cases.
The federal judiciary can begin to resolve much of this confusion by
adopting a single, uniform standard for determining whether the amount in
controversy requirement has been satisfied. For the reasons stated in Part II(C)
of this Article, the "legal certainty test" enunciated by the Supreme Court in St.
PaulMercury v. Red Cab Co. should be applied to all removal cases as well as
to original jurisdiction diversity cases. Under this inquiry, the party invoking the
court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that (1) it is not legally
impossible for the plaintiff to recover in excess of the jurisdictional amount-i.e.,
that the plaintiffs cause of action does not limit recovery to a fixed amount that
is below the federal minimum; and (2) in cases where the amount of damages is
not limited by the cause of action, that it is notfactually impossible for the
plaintiff to recover such an amount-i.e., that there is a reasonable expectation
that ajury would award damages in excess of the federal minimum.
While adoption of this uniform standard is a necessary first step, Congress
should take additional steps to correct the procedural dilemmas that exist under
the current statutory scheme. Part IV of this Article suggests that one way to
correct many of these defects is to allow defendants to file a notice of removal
based upon a good faith belief that the amount in controversy in fact exceeds
$75,000. The plaintiff, on the other hand, can secure a prompt remand by filing
a binding stipulation that the amount in controversy does not exceed the federal
minimum-i.e., that the plaintiff is willing to forego any recovery in excess of
that amount. Otherwise, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the
reasonable expectation that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Until Congress or the courts take action to remedy the defects in the
removal process, plaintiffs and defendants should be equally wary of the
unsettled status of the law. Accordingly, they would be well advised to
thoroughly research the position taken by the applicable district court or court
of appeals regarding the jurisdictional standard. Attorneys also should become
familiar with those courts' interpretation of disputed procedural issues, such as
when the notice of removal must be filed and what evidence may be considered
in determining whether the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied.
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